BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND
INSTRUCTION 90-201

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Command Policy

THE INSPECTION SYSTEM

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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This instruction implements and expands on the guidance in AFPD 90-2, *Inspector General-The Inspection System* and AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*, setting policy and establishing procedures for the AMC Inspection System. It applies to all AMC units, functions, and activities and to Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) units that are inspected or assessed by the AMC Inspector General (HQ AMC/IG). This publication applies to the ANG when published in ANGIND2**.** This publication applies to AFRC when published in AFRC Index 2 or when announced in the AFRC Publishing Bulletin. The implementation and application of procedures outlined by this instruction are not a basis for a change in number, type, and kind of manpower requirements or authorizations. This instruction requires the IG to collect and maintain information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974, authorized by 10 U.S.C. 8013, Secretary of the Air Force: powers and duties; delegation by, and 10 U.S.C. 8020, Inspector General. Collecting the Social Security Number as a personal identifier is authorized by Executive Order 9397, 22 November 1943, and is used to positively identify personnel. System of Records F120 AF IG B, Inspector General Records, applies. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by the Air Force.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed.

The most significant changes to this instruction are in the following areas: AMC Gatekeeper Program, Unit Compliance Inspections (UCI), Initial Response (IR) Inspections, Unit Self-Inspection (SI) Program, Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) Inspections, and Nuclear Surety Inspections (NSI).

Chapter 1

THE INSPECTION PROGRAM

1.1. General. HQ AMC/IG conducts formal inspections directed by higher authority and reports results to that authority. An inspection is an official examination of representative mission capability, programs, and mission support operations. Personnel performing inspections examine the ability of AMC and AMC-gained units to carry out their assigned roles. Inspectors evaluate and report on the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of Air Force organizations and functions. They investigate those areas directed by the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or the AMC Commander. The inspection system extends into every field of AMC affairs, including AMC units participating in joint exercises and contingencies**.**

1.2. Objectives. The inspection program is designed to assess and improve the capability of the command and its assigned units to perform their missions and to provide feedback to HQ AMC, NAF, and unit commanders. Specifically, the inspection system will:

1.2.1. Measure command readiness and identify readiness issues and other problems.

1.2.2. Ensure command priorities are communicated and are being met.

1.2.3. Measure effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of units, functions, programs, and guidance.

1.2.4. Validate and compare management information reported through other staff agencies.

1.2.5. Promote an expeditionary culture within AMC.

1.2.6. Assess by-law and mission compliance areas identified by senior AF and MAJCOM leadership.

1.3. Concept of the AMC Inspection System.

1.3.1. HQ AMC/IG conducts the following inspections:

1.3.1.1. Expeditionary Operational Readiness Inspections (EORI) evaluate a unit's ability to perform its wartime mission.

1.3.1.2. Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) Inspections evaluate a unit’s ability to meet its tasked SIOP responsibilities.

1.3.1.3. Nuclear Surety Inspections (NSI) evaluate a unit's ability to perform its nuclear mission.

1.3.1.4. En route Readiness Inspections (ERI) evaluate an en route support unit’s ability to perform its peacetime and wartime missions.

1.3.1.5. Unit Compliance Inspections (UCI) are conducted to assess areas mandated by law as well as mission areas identified by senior Air Force and MAJCOM leadership as critical or important to assess/assure the health and performance of organizations.

1.3.1.6. Special Interest Item (SII) Inspections evaluate areas of special interest to the AF or AMC.

1.3.1.7. Multi-MAJCOM Inspections (MMI) are conducted in coordination and concert with another MAJCOM IG team, when deemed appropriate. These inspections evaluate co-located units integrated into a multi-MAJCOM operation.

1.3.1.8. Initial Response (IR) Inspections evaluate a unit's ability to mobilize its OPLAN taskings.

1.3.2. HQ AMC inspections use tasks, standards, and measures published in the AMC Task List (AMCTL), where available and appropriate, to evaluate readiness. AMCTL standards and measures are combined with other staff guidance into checklist form and published in AMCPAM 90-202.

1.3.3. Inspections focus on actual unit performance as the primary indicator of readiness. The IG team will only use academic testing where other means do not adequately measure capability.

1.3.4. The IG publishes an inspection report after every inspection. Additionally, the IG maintains a database that allows commanders at every level to determine their units' strengths and weaknesses.

1.4. Inspection Scheduling and Notification.

1.4.1. HQ AMC/IGPS schedules IG inspections based on such factors as AEF deployments, time since last inspection, recent unit/unit type code (UTC) performance, mission priority, NAF or command-wide focus areas, and Air Force requirements. **Chapter 2** through **Chapter 7** contain scheduling information specific to each inspection type.

1.4.2. AMC provides notice of inspections except where appropriately called for in conjunction with MMIs or during an NSI.

1.5. Gatekeeper Program

1.5.1. HQ AMC, along with other Air Force, DOD, and non-DOD agencies, conduct numerous inspections, award visits, and staff assistance visits (SAV) to field units. HQ AMC/IG is responsible for monitoring and tracking these activities under the AF Gatekeeper Program. Each AMC host installation is required to assign a gatekeeper who will coordinate with the MAJCOM gatekeeper to deconflict visit activities and keep unit commanders informed. The HQ AMC gatekeeper is required to track and deconflict all visits to AMC host units to minimize impacts and lessen the visit footprint. Both the MAJCOM and host-base gatekeepers are required to evaluate visit notifications to determine if they are duplicative, or can be consolidated or eliminated. The HQ AMC gatekeeper ensures coordination with visiting agencies prior to making decisions for visit rescheduling, consolidation, or possible elimination. Visits to AMC-gained Guard and Reserve units should be coordinated with the NGB and AFRC gatekeeper, respectively. Visits to tenant units located on another MAJCOM's installation should be coordinated with that MAJCOM's gatekeeper. A current list of AFRC, NGB, and other Air Force MAJCOM gatekeeper contacts can be found on the HQ AMC/IG Gatekeeper Website at **https://amc.scott.af.mil/ig/html/index.htm**.

1.5.2. HQ AMC, Air Force, DOD, and non-DOD visiting agencies only. All visiting agencies are required to contact the gatekeeper and deconflict visit activity. Visits will be categorized and prioritized accordingly into one of the following four groups*: Combat Readiness, Resource Management, Awards,* and *Others*.

1.5.2.1. Combat Readiness visits include EORIs, SIOP Inspections, ASEVs, NSIs, UCIs, and other readiness-related compliance inspections.

1.5.2.2. Resource Management includes visits, such as, SAVs, Environmental Compliance Assessment and Management Program, Air Force Audit Agency Audits, Information Awareness and Assurance visits, Health Services Inspections, Logistics Standardization and Evaluation Program.

1.5.2.3. Examples of award visits include Innkeeper, Curtain, and the Base Appearance Program assessments.

1.5.2.4. The other category includes visits related to the Commissary, AAFES, band, community, congressional or any other visits that do not fit in the above categories. NAF and headquarters staff attached to units for flying training (e.g., currency, ground training, etc.) or evaluators conducting pyramid evaluations, are exempt from all gatekeeper notification requirements.

1.5.2.5. Units scheduled, approved, and notified via the semiannual AMC Command-Wide Inspection Schedule message are automatically included in the AMC gatekeeper process. Notify the gatekeeper as soon as possible if a significant change in the number of visitors or visit duration occurs. The wing commander at the host installation may deny visits to AMC bases not cleared through the gatekeeper process.

1.5.3. HQ AMC/IGPS is the HQ AMC Gatekeeper, DSN 779-0421, E-mail: **mailto:AMC.IG.GATEKEEPER@SCOTT.AF.MIL**.

1.5.4. HQ AMC, Air Force, DOD, and non-DOD visiting agencies will provide the command gatekeeper (HQ AMC/IGPS) a copy of their proposed visit schedule for each upcoming fiscal quarter, 30 days prior to start of affected quarter. For short-notice visits, provide advance notification/visit requests as soon as possible to allow time for de-confliction. E-mail or fax visit request data to HQ AMC/IGPS, DSN 779-0237. Include the following:

1.5.4.1. Visiting Agency (including POC name, office, and telephone number).

1.5.4.2. AMC unit or activity being visited (including POC name, office, and phone number if known).

1.5.4.3. Purpose of visit.

1.5.4.4. Approximate number of personnel visiting the unit.

1.5.4.5. Visit dates.

1.5.4.6. Source document (e.g., AFI, AMCI, etc.) directing the visit or documentation of unit requesting the visit.

1.6. Inspection Criteria.

1.6.1. For EORIs, UCIs, ERIs, and SIOP Inspections, the HQ AMC/IG will use criteria published in AMCPAM 90-202, *Inspection Guide* or posted on the AMC/IG website. The AMC staff will base AMCPAM 90-202 criteria on the AMCTL where possible. However, where readiness requirements are not fully covered by the AMCTL, the IG in conjunction with the staff will publish additional criteria so the IG can assess all key readiness areas.

1.6.2. Additional inspection criteria should define the standards against which the inspected unit and functional areas are compared when determining inspection ratings. The following are general guidelines to follow:

1.6.2.1. Define a logical balance of subjective and objective assessments.

1.6.2.2. Provide fairly uniform depth over the range of mission tasks.

1.6.2.3. Avoid loopholes that may result in inaccurate ratings.

1.6.2.4. Not be unnecessarily tough or unrealistically easy, but based on standards of performance defined in AMCTL, Designed Operational Capability (DOC) statements, Mission Essential Tasks (MET), Air Force-Wide UTC Availability/Tasking Summary (AFWUS), support plans, and other directives.

1.6.2.5. Provide enough information for inspectors to do their job and inspected units to understand what level of performance is required.

1.6.2.6. Assess mission capabilities using the projected combat environment.

1.6.2.7. Encourage innovation and delegation of authority.

1.6.2.8. Orient, when possible, toward observed actions rather than academic testing or interviews.

1.6.2.9. Look beyond results to determine if processes are sound.

1.6.3. NSI Criteria. HQ AMC/SEN provides updated inspection checklists to the IG prior to each inspection. These checklists consolidate NSI criteria from DTRA, DoD, DoE, AF, and HQ AMC. Wing NSMs should coordinate checklist items with HQ AMC/SEN, 510 POW-MIA Drive, Building P-40E, Room E-120, Scott Air Force Base IL 62225-5020.

1.6.4. UCI Criteria. AMCI 90-201, **Attachment 3**, is the source reference for the AMC Common Core Compliance Areas. The IG will base UCIs on by-law requirements, executive orders, DOD directives, and Air Force, MAJCOM, and applicable ANG instructions. The staff-developed UCI Checklists are posted on the AMC/IG website.

1.7. Inspection Initiation, Termination, and Feedback.

1.7.1. Initiation. IG inspections officially begin when the first HQ AMC/IG inspector arrives at the inspection site.

1.7.2. Termination. The IG team chief will inform inspected unit leadership when the inspection is officially terminated.

1.7.3. Feedback. The team chief normally conducts an informal inbrief with senior leadership when an inspection begins and provides periodic feedback during the inspection. Additionally, at his/her determination, the team chief will conduct an informal outbrief at the conclusion of an inspection and a mass theater outbrief, as appropriate. IG inspectors provide feedback to their functional counterparts throughout the inspection.

1.8. HQ AMC Staff and IG Responsibilities.

1.8.1. HQ AMC staff will:

1.8.1.1. Designate "trusted agents" for inspection support, as required.

1.8.1.2. Develop inspection criteria, worksheets, and checklists and revise them as necessary.

1.8.1.3. Submit inspection Training, Test, and Ferry (TTF) flying hour requirements as part of the overall AMC flying-hour request. The AMC staff and AMC/IG will coordinate with HQ AFRC/DOOM/DOTS on the projected number of TTF hours (include number of aircraft to launch and recover and any special requirements) required to support AFRC unit inspections.

1.8.1.4. Schedule/coordinate Air Mobility Operations Group and/or CONUS Special Tactics Teams to support inspected units when required.

1.8.1.5. Assist the IG team with obtaining theater clearance when required for inspections.

1.8.2. HQ AMC/IG will:

1.8.2.1. Maintain a list of all units and activities within the command and inspect all except those exempted.

1.8.2.2. Plan and conduct the following inspections in accordance with AFI 90-201, AMCPAM 90-202, and this document: EORIs, NSIs, ERIs, SIOP Inspections, UCIs, SII Inspections, and when required, MMIs.

1.8.2.3. Inform SAF/IG of inspection schedules and changes.

1.8.2.4. Analyze inspection findings and report results to the AMC/CC and his staff.

1.8.2.5. Provide feedback to inspected units and command and staff agencies at all levels.

1.8.2.6. Identify readiness issues.

1.8.2.7. Identify inspection support requirements to inspected units. Requirements may include billeting, transportation, work areas, etc.

1.8.2.8. Request augmentation from the HQ/NAF staff other IGs or AMC and AMC-gained units (through their respective functional staffs) when required. Provide TDY funds for augmentation personnel and Military Personnel Appropriation (MPA) man-days for Guard and Reserve augmentation personnel.

1.8.2.9. Provide augmentation support to other agencies, when possible.

1.8.2.10. Carefully review and edit each inspection report to ensure security protection (i.e., proper classification and application of markings). Consult DoD Regulation 5400.7-R, *DoD Freedom of Information Act Program*, for marking document/pages containing "For Official Use Only" information.

1.8.2.11. Designate trusted agents to handle and safeguard programming and planning information until released by the IG. Clearly mark schedules and other inspection sensitive information "TRUSTED AGENT INFORMATION."

1.8.2.12. Provide inspected leadership an authenticated entry authority list (EAL) that includes all team members and augmentation personnel. EALs must be completed IAW AFI 31-101, *The Air Force Installation Security Program*, paragraph 9.10.2.

1.8.2.13. Write and post an electronic copy of inspection reports on the IG web site, allowing access to authorized units. Provide hardcopy reports to the AMC/CC and SAF/IG.

1.8.2.14. Maintain a current database of inspection results that describes the readiness of the command. This information will be made available to commanders at all levels.

1.8.2.15. Coordinate updates to this instruction annually.

1.9. Unit Responsibilities.

1.9.1. Inspected units will:

1.9.1.1. Designate a project officer upon inspection notification to act as the single focal point.

1.9.1.2. Forward to the IG a safety briefing covering unique local driving hazards and laws, (unit safety officer), Force Protection Awareness Briefing (Intel officer), and flight line driving procedures (airfield manager). An IG team POC will brief this information during the inspection team's pre-departure meeting. These procedures only apply when the IG conducts part of its inspection at the unit's home station.

1.9.1.3. Coordinate support with the IG team administrative representative. The administrative representative will identify specific support requirements prior to scheduled arrival. See **Chapter 8** of this instruction for additional support requirements.

1.9.1.4. Grant unescorted entry into unit controlled/restricted areas to Air Force, AMC, and USSTRATCOM inspectors who fulfill requirements of AFI 31-101, *The Air Force Installation Security Program*. The AF Form 1199-series and an EAL for supporting verification satisfy unescorted entry requirements for inspectors. Do not subject inspectors to any identification or search requirements not imposed on unit personnel. Additionally, grant access to information for which an inspector has a need-to-know to complete an inspection.

1.9.1.5. Designate trusted agents to coordinate inspection details if requested by the IG. Trusted agents will not divulge any information to unauthorized individuals. Commanders at all levels will ensure the integrity of the trusted agent system. If a commander discovers an unauthorized disclosure, he or she must take immediate action to correct the problem and inform the IG that trusted agent information has been compromised.

1.9.1.6. After the inspection, units will:

1.9.1.6.1. Prioritize and correct validated deficiencies identified during all inspections.

1.9.1.6.2. Critically examine the cost and benefit of implementing IG-identified crosstells or best practices.

1.10. Inspector Requirements and Augmentation Procedures.

1.10.1. Inspectors will be fully qualified and experienced in their functional areas. The IG training branch (IGCT) designs and conducts initial training for new inspectors.

1.10.2. After completing an inspection tour, inspectors are not usually reassigned to inspection duties for at least 3 years. Personnel who are serving in an inspection organization, but are doing less than full-time inspection duties, come under those rules for a normal tour length.

1.10.3. Because of extensive TDY requirements, IG members will be excused from base detail duties.

1.10.4. NAFs, ANG and AFRC units, and direct reporting units (DRU) should provide personnel with special skills to assist with inspections when requested. HQ AMC/IG will provide TDY funds and man-days (Guard and Reserve applicable) for augmentation personnel.

1.11. Observer Program.

1.11.1. Purpose. The observer program provides AMC active duty and AMC-gained Guard and Reserve units and HHQ staff with an opportunity to witness how the HQ AMC/IG team conducts an inspection. The goal of the observer program is to assist units in designing effective self-inspection programs and ultimately improve combat capability and readiness. Opportunities to observe inspections are limited, and if more exposure to the inspection system is desired, HQ AMC/IG recommends participation in one of its inspections as an IG augmenter. More information on augmenting the IG team is available by calling the applicable functional area on the team.

1.11.2. Restrictions. Units may observe only one IG Exercise (IGX), NSI, or SIOP Inspection per inspection cycle. Units may not request to send observers to the same inspection their unit is participating in. Do not request to "split" your request allowing one observer to attend one inspection, and then send observers to another inspection of the same type. Requests to observe will be prioritized based on such factors as projected inspection dates, date of request, number of observer requests from that unit, and rank/position of the observer. The observer program does not extend to inspections conducted during real-world activities, training exercises, or CJCS Exercises. The IG restricts units to a maximum of two observer positions for any given inspection. HQ AMC/IGI will make the final determination of which observers have been approved no later than 30 days prior to the inspection. All observers who have applied will be notified of their status. The number of observers will be based on size and scope of the inspection. No more than eight total observer positions per inspection will be approved. If more than eight qualified observers apply, priority will be given based on the criteria mentioned above. Due to the limited number of observer spaces available, unit representatives should make the best use of the opportunity by planning to observe as much of the inspection as possible.

1.11.3. Procedures. Units will submit a message or fax to IGPS (DSN 779-0464) no later than 45 days prior to the site visit date. AFRC units must send their requests through HQ AFRC/IGIO and ANG units through NGB/IGD. Requests must contain the following for each observer:

1.11.3.1. Last name, first name, and middle initial.

1.11.3.2. Rank.

1.11.3.3. Social Security Number.

1.11.3.4. Security clearance. Note: For SIOP inspections, observers must have their unit security manager fax a verification of security clearance letter to the IG security manager.

1.11.3.5. Card number from the reverse side of AF Form 1199, **Air Force Entry Control Card**.

1.11.3.6. Current organization/office symbol, duty phone, and E-mail address.

1.11.3.7. List of locations the observer would like to visit (i.e. Forward Operating Base, NSI at McChord, etc.)

NOTE: The HQ AMC/IG will annotate observer information on its team composition list to be used by the inspected unit as an EAL.

1.11.4. Observers are required to fund and arrange for their own travel, billeting, and ground transportation. Observers will protect all TRUSTED AGENT information.

1.11.5. Upon arrival at the inspection site, observers must immediately report to the IG team chief or senior IG inspector for a briefing on their responsibilities and limitations. Observers must not interfere

in any way with the operations of the inspected unit or the IG team. Photo and/or video equipment will not be allowed during any type of IG inspection. Due to the sensitive nature of material presented for discussion, unit-level observers will not be permitted to attend IG team meetings.

1.12. Inspection Reports and Briefings.

1.12.1. The IG produces a report after every inspection highlighting problem areas and areas of excellence. The AMC IG distributes all inspection reports electronically to parent wing/CCs. Inspection reports for AMC-gained AFRC units will be electronically sent to HQ AFRC/IG to include parent wing/CCs. Units may access inspection reports from the IG web site: **https://amc.scott.af.mil/ig/html/inspect3.htm** and then click on the appropriate "Inspections Report (af.mil only)" link. AMC/IG will load UTC and task/standard-specific comments to the IG Performance Reporting System (IGPRS) that is available from the IG web site (**https://140.175.6.44/igprs**)

1.12.2. HQ AMC/IG will brief the AMC Commander and the HQ AMC staff semi-annually on results of EORI, NSI, ERI, and SIOP Inspections. Additionally, the IG will cover systemic issues, UCIs, and SIIs.

1.13. Self-Inspection Program. The Self-Inspection program is an AMC-directed, unit commander program that focuses on high-priority items of interest within each functional staff area of responsibility. The purpose of Self-Inspections is to provide commanders with a tool for internal assessment of unit health and to complement external inspections and assessments.

1.13.1. HQ AMC/IG Responsibilities:

1.13.1.1. Maintain Self-Inspection program oversight for HQ AMC.

1.13.1.2. Be focal point for Self-Inspection issues requiring HHQ assistance or providing valuable crosstell.

1.13.1.3. Assess Unit Self-Inspection programs during UCIs.

1.13.2. HQ AMC Staff Responsibilities:

1.13.2.1. Maintain Self-Inspection checklists on their respective HQ AMC functional web page. These checklists complement but do not replace other AMC inspection checklists or the AMC mission essential tasks.

1.13.2.2. Review Self-Inspection checklists annually to ensure currency and relevancy.

1.13.3. Unit Responsibilities:

1.13.3.1. AMC units will accomplish applicable Self-Inspection checklists every 6 months (active duty) or 1 year (ANG), or more frequently as requested by the applicable functional manager.

1.13.3.2. Units will upchannel issues requiring HQ assistance through their NAF and AMC/IG for tracking purposes. ANG units will also upchannel issues to the ANG functional staff.

1.13.3.3. Units will accomplish a Self-Inspection within 6 months of a new WG/CC taking command and forward the results to their NAF/CC (active duty) or their respective state's Adjutant General (TAG) (ANG).

1.13.3.4. Although AFRC units are welcome to use AMC Self-Inspection checklists to supplement AFRC checklists, AFRC units and functional staffs will follow guidance on the AFRC/IG web page concerning the use of Self-Inspections and the reviews/updates of respective checklists.

1.13.3.5. AMC gained ANG units may use the ANG C&SRLs, UCI Checklists, or AMC Functional Self-Inspection Checklists for their Self-Inspection Program.

Chapter 2

EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTIONS (EORI)

2.1. General.

2.1.1. Inspection Concept. Every AMC unit (active and gained) that has a Unit Type Code (UTC) that is coded in the AFWUS as available to deploy (i.e. not coded "DXX") or that has a DOC statement is susceptible to an EORI tasking. EORIs focus on performance at the UTC-level and assess readiness against standards published in the AMCTL and AMCPAM 90-202. HQ AMC/IG tracks UTC readiness ratings in a database accessible by units.

2.1.1.1. To ensure responsibility and accountability, HQ AMC/IG should inspect integral UTCs. If more than one unit supplies manpower and equipment to the UTC, the IG may assess UTC readiness of the inspected unit's portion of the UTC by itself or in conjunction with the other unit(s) involved.

2.1.2. Inspection Frequency and Philosophy. The IG database will contain date-stamped UTC assessments that last for 30 months (active duty) or 5 years (Guard and Reserve). This provides a rolling assessment database from a larger number of "mini-inspections" that do not all expire at one time and gives the AMC Commander an inspection system that measures continuous, predictive readiness which compliments Status of Resources and Training Systems (SORTS).

2.1.3. Inspection Types. EORIs include IG-Generated Exercises (IGX) and Readiness Assessment Teams (RAT), which are direct observations of real-world operations (AEF deployments, CJCS exercises, contingency operations, significant JA/ATTs, and other opportunities).

2.1.3.1. An IGX assesses UTCs from various units, combined into an expeditionary wing/group. The goal is a doctrinally sound scenario that emphasizes team building and fosters an expeditionary culture, thus mirroring real-world operations. The IG normally conducts the IGX at one of the Combat Readiness Training Centers (CRTC), but may use other locations. An IGX normally lasts up to 14 days with a complete swapout of forces at the midpoint. An IGX measures total-force capability being phased in and out of the exercise in such a manner that it simulates the buildup of an expeditionary wing/group. For lead units, several pieces of capability (UTCs) may be tasked, and the lead unit will be responsible for effectively managing the overall swap-out of forces. Follow-on units will fill in the gaps. An IGX will reflect, to the greatest extent possible, AMC's response to the JCS Crisis Action System. Depending on the specific EORI scenario, units will receive an intelligence buildup or crisis-response tasking, higher headquarters messages, and other applicable communications reflecting the phases of JCS time-sensitive planning. Intelligence message traffic flow will begin 7 to 45 days prior to the beginning of an IGX, depending on the scenario.

2.1.3.2. Readiness Assessment Team (RAT) inspections--will be used to assess UTCs during unit operations at deployed locations, and strategic airlift operations. The IG conducts these inspections with small teams and inspects in such a manner as not to interfere with the unit's operational tasking. The IG will engage with the inspected unit to determine readiness; however, the IG will not delay/hinder deployment or employment operations. The IG will identify safety concerns in accordance with procedures listed in paragraph **2.1.6.** and inspect ATSO during EORIs conducted at suitable contingency training sites or deployed locations. Ideally, ATSO should be inspected

during large-scale exercises or concurrent with other inspections; however, this may not always be feasible. In these situations an ATSO RAT is possible if personnel participate in IG-generated scenarios. This will depend on their mission and after approval of the deployed commander and host-unit commander. The IG will attempt to inspect ATSO during a RAT using the following criteria:

2.1.3.2.1. Personnel perform their primary mission tasks (as listed in the MISCAP) in an ATSO environment.

2.1.3.2.2. Units requiring RATS are able to complete identified ATSO tasks at some time during the inspection. Units unable to complete these tasks will not be given an ATSO grade.

2.1.3.2.3. During an ATSO scenario, the UTC will operate a unit control center (UCC) or report to a UCC participating in the scenario. The UCC must operate IAW AMC Unit Level Mission Essential Tasks Version 2.0 task 7.01.03 Measures (M2-M4, M6-M7).

2.1.3.2.4. The AMC-IG will inspect the following critical ATSO tasks and measures in the AMC Unit Level Mission Essential Tasks Version 2.0:

6.08.01	Execute Pre-Attack/Disaster Actions, M1, M2, M4, and M7.
6.08.02.	Trans Attack/Disaster Response Action, M1-M3.
6.08.03	Execute Post Attack/Disaster Response Actions, M1, M7, and M8.
7.01.03	Activate Unit Control Centers, M2-M4, and M6-M7.

2.1.4. AFRC Associate Units.

2.1.4.1. When tasked separately, AFRC Associate UTCs will be evaluated in the same manner as any other AFRC UTC.

2.1.4.2. When tasked as part of an active duty host unit, associate personnel will participate to the maximum extent possible in all EORI-tasked events. Normally, associate personnel should account for approximately twenty-five percent of total manning.

2.1.4.3. Within the parameters of existing funding limitations, this instruction requires the maximum use of Air Reserve Technicians (ART) and available reservists in the following functional areas: operations, intelligence, maintenance, supply, aerial port, security forces, civil engineers (including PRIME BEEF), services (including PRIME RIBS), medical, aeromedical, and communication flights. Take action to preclude ART overtime. AFRC pays minimum-essential overtime when the AFRC associate unit commander approves it in advance. AMC will not fund overtime.

2.1.5. Strategic Airlift Units. The command seldom “deploys” an aviation package of a strategic airlift unit, but the units perform their primary mission on a day-to-day basis in a benign environment. To inspect these units as part of a designed operational capability inspection, HQ AMC/IG will want to look at what is tasked by the TACC during real-world events. The tasking level should be no lower than 40 percent of the unit’s assigned PAA and not more than the command’s established commitment level. Deployable UTCs that the IG considers “inspectable” will be assessed during an IGX or actual deployment.

2.1.6. Safety. Unit commanders are responsible for ensuring safe operations during an EORI. Commanders may deviate from any part of an EORI scenario when conditions compromise safety. Unit

members will not take actions that might result in injury to personnel or damage to aircraft, equipment, or property. Actual emergencies always take precedence over exercise activity. Advise the HQ AMC/IG functional area inspector of the reasons for the cancellation of or deviation from any exercise scenario. During designed operational capability inspections, inspectors operate on a noninterference basis; however, if an inspector sees an unsafe condition, he/she will immediately identify the safety concern to the individual involved, then report it to the unit commander and IG team chief. The IG will document significant safety issues in the EORI report.

2.2. Responsibilities. In addition to responsibilities described in **Chapter 1** of this instruction, identified organizations have the following responsibilities for planning, supporting, and executing EORIs.

2.2.1. HQ AMC/IG will:

2.2.1.1. Develop realistic EORI scenarios for each IGX covering a broad range of AMC missions. The IG will incorporate expected wartime threats into its scenarios that force inspected units to properly plan and react.

2.2.1.2. Schedule all required activities into a doctrinally sound inspection scenario. When key functions are not available for inspection, the IG will coordinate that support from non-inspected units--for example, real-world medical and support.

2.2.1.3. Accomplish planning and coordination jointly with the AMC staff, TACC, USTRANSCOM staff, and, where applicable, theater exercise planners.

2.2.1.4. Coordinate country/theater clearance for inspectors when required.

2.2.1.5. Coordinate airspace reservations with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), range controls, or foreign governmental agencies, as required.

2.2.1.6. Coordinate mission support at each deployed location of an IGX (main operating base, forward operating locations, RRR exercise site, etc.).

2.2.1.7. Coordinate with 805 CSS/TAC for frequencies and equipment at least 120-days prior for CONUS and 270 days prior for non-CONUS EORIs.

2.2.1.8. Ensure all inspectors involved in the handling of pyrotechnics are trained in accordance with AFMAN 91-201, *Explosives Safety Standards.*

2.2.1.9. Notify host-base gatekeeper prior to inspecting AMC tenant units.

2.2.1.10. Work directly with units on unit shortfalls (IGP).

2.2.1.11. Coordinate with HG AMC/IG functional OPRs, NAFs, and NGB to identify augmentation requirements with as much lead time as possible prior to the inspection.

2.2.2. NAFs/NGB will:

2.2.2.1. Validate/coordinate with units on all UTC or opt-outs of previously scheduled EORIs and submit replacement UTC candidates for IGX opt-outs. This coordination will occur prior to forwarding requests to HQ AMC/IGP and will only do so upon approval of NAF/CC or CV, or NGB IG. NAFs/NGB IG will provide replacements when capable.

2.2.2.2. Suggest EORI focus areas and confirm HQ AMC/IG recommendations on EORI scenarios.

2.2.2.3. Highlight subordinate unit problem areas to HQ AMC/IG, recommending areas that need to be stressed during EORIs.

2.2.2.4. Designate "trusted agents" as required.

2.2.2.5. Provide augmentation personnel for the HQ AMC/IG team as necessary.

2.2.2.6. Review inspection results and unit-submitted corrective action plans, directing re-inspection when deemed necessary.

2.2.2.7. Approve corrective action plan provided by subordinate wings and determine re-inspection requirements.

2.2.3. Inspected units will:

2.2.3.1. Be proactive in scheduling their inspectable UTCs into the desired EORI venue so as to meet their prescribed EORI frequency as described in para **2.1.2.**

2.2.3.2. Allow IG teams full access to their home base or deployed location to conduct inspections. AMC tenants will coordinate access with the host wing.

2.2.3.3. Provide operational aircraft and manpower with the necessary equipment to fully participate in IGXs. Units will also use their own training time when participating in an IGX.

2.2.3.4. Work directly with HQ AMC/IGP on all personnel and equipment shortfalls. Only those shortfalls that result in the shortfall of an entire UTC and UTC opt-outs should be submitted to the respective NAF and NGB IG for approval/resolution. All UTC shortfalls should be submitted IAW AFI 10-403.

2.2.3.5. Coordinate with controlling agencies, as necessary, for rescheduling or cancellation of previously assigned tasking(s) to allow the unit to participate in an IGX.

2.2.3.6. Support IG inspection team transportation requirements. To the maximum extent possible, inspected units will transport the IG team to and from inspection locations. (See **Chapter 8** in this regulation for further guidance.)

2.2.3.7. During an IGX, support transiting airlift missions in accordance with established agreements/procedures.

2.2.3.8. Coordinate with the appropriate FAA air route traffic control center (ARTCC), approach control, or foreign governmental agencies for routing of assigned missions when the controlling headquarters does not take this action. Contact these agencies as soon as possible, but no later than 12 hours (when possible) prior to the first departure.

2.2.3.9. When the EORI is not conducted in conjunction with a CJCS exercise or real-world operation, enter the flag words "EXERCISE CRISIS REACH YY-XX" in the remarks section of all DD Forms 175, **Military Flight Plan**, and DD Forms 1801, **DoD International Flight Plan**, submitted in support of the EORI. YY-XX is the year and sequence number of the EORI (e.g., CRISIS REACH 98-01). When the EORI is conducted in conjunction with a CJCS exercise or real-world operation, follow instructions published in the OPORD.

2.2.3.10. Correct discrepancies identified during an EORI and report corrective action to the NAF/CC, HQ AMC functional staff, and HQ AMC/IG. (Procedures are described in paragraph **2.4.**)

2.3. IG Ground Rules for IG Inspections and AMC Form 188.

2.3.1. *Ground Rules for IG Inspections*. The HQ AMC/IG publishes detailed inspection procedures and a list of standard simulations for IGXs at: **https://amc.scott.af.mil/ig/html/index.htm**. Inspected units should not submit requests for simulations that are listed in the ground rules.

2.3.2. AMC Form 188, **Inspection/Exercise Communication, Coordination Form**. After the IG inspection team arrives, inspected units (UTCs) should use AMC Form 188 to request simulations not covered in the ground rules. The 188 can also be used as a record of communication with the IG when required. At the deployed location, personnel should route all AMC Forms 188 through the designated lead wing.

2.3.2.1. Processing Procedures. HQ AMC/IG will designate one team member to receive AMC Forms 188 from inspected units; units should route all 188s to that POC. Normally, the POC is the CAT inspector, WOC inspector, C2 inspector, or DCC inspector. Units will designate a central location (typically in the WOC) to place their completed 188s that are ready for IG coordination.

2.3.2.2. The IG will approve simulations only when it is impossible or impractical to perform actual procedures or to use specified equipment. All requests for simulations must answer the following questions:

2.3.2.2.1. WHAT? (Describe the simulated task or equipment.)

2.3.2.2.2. HOW? (Describe how the unit will simulate the task.)

2.3.2.2.3. WHY? (Provide a brief explanation of why the simulation is required and the impact if the IG disapproves the simulation.)

2.4. Grading.

2.4.1. Grading Concept. To the maximum extent possible, AMC will use standards and measures published in the AMCTL as a basis for writing its inspection guide, AMCPAM 90-202. IG inspectors use AMCPAM 90-202 criteria to assign grades to mission essential and supporting tasks. These grades ultimately roll up to UTC grades. If the IG does not observe sufficient activity, the team chief may not assign a grade to a specific MET or UTC. However, IG inspectors will still provide feedback to the unit and may note observations in its inspection report.

2.4.2. Inspection Grades. For each applicable task in AMCPAM 90-202, an IG inspector assesses unit performance against the published standard as “mission ready - GREEN,” “ready with comments that require action or attention - LIGHT GREEN,” or “not mission ready - RED.” Grades assigned at the task-level roll up to an overall grade for each inspected UTC using the traditional five tier grade scale.

2.4.2.1. If it is determined during an IG inspection that a UTC cannot meet all or part of its MISCAP, it should be appropriately reflected in ART, and the reason recorded in the remarks with an associated Get Well Date. HQ AMC/IG will forward notification of Unsatisfactory UTCs to HQ AMC/DOOC to ensure accurate ART reporting. Once corrective actions have been completed and the wing/CC or equivalent determines the correct UTC status, the unit will return the ART status to the appropriate color.

2.4.3. Corrective Actions. Units that receive a “Marginal” or “Unsatisfactory” grade for any of their UTCs must take immediate action to correct major discrepancies. The inspected unit commander must also submit a corrective action plan to the NAF/CC (for active duty and AFRC units), applicable HQ

AMC functional OPR, and HQ AMC/IG, describing the corrective action taken or the action plan devised to correct the problem. AFRC and ANG units will also send their corrective action plans to AFRC or NGB functional OPR and IG as appropriate. The NAF/CC or NGB/IG (as appropriate) will review the unit Corrective Action Plan and make the final determination when corrective actions are complete. Units will continue monthly reporting until the corrective action is deemed sufficient.

2.4.3.1. HQ AMC/IGCY will officially notify inspected units of the suspense for submitting corrective action plans; normally 10 working days after the IG signs the inspection report.

2.4.4. Re-inspection. UTCs that receive a "Marginal" or "Unsatisfactory" grade may be re-inspected at the direction of the AMC/CC, AMC/CV, or NAF/CC (active or Reserve as appropriate) and NGB/IG for the ANG. HQ AMC/IG will notify the unit of re-inspection requirements. Grades in the IG database will not be changed allowing the IG to trend problem areas; however, credit will be given when UTCs meet readiness criteria.

2.4.5. Assessment Database. The IG displays assessment results in a database with drill-down capability for comments. AMC personnel can view the database over the Internet from any location with an ".af.mil" address; procedures for viewing the database are posted on the IG web site.

2.4.6. Unit EORI Grades. UTC grades will roll up into a five-tier grade for the Major Graded Areas in para **2.4.7.** and eventually roll-up into an overall unit grade once the IG assesses a sufficient number of UTCs.

2.4.7. Major Graded Areas.

2.4.7.1. Initial Response (IR). Initial Response encompasses the command and control, execution, and management of deployment processes. There are numerous tasks in the AMCTL that are applicable to AMC force deployment. When associated with the deployment process, these tasks reflect the integrated performance of the home station "deployment organization" and are not tied directly to any specific UTC. To capture this process, the IG created a "Unit Generation" placeholder in the inspection database. Assessment of IR will encompass all observed tasks from initial receipt of deployment tasking until forces arrive at destination. For units deploying on non-organic lift, responsibility for the deployment process generally ends when forces are successfully loaded and ready for departure. For organic deployments, unit responsibility for the deployment process generally ends when forces reach their final destination.

2.4.7.1.1. At the time of inspection, units will generate 100 percent of possessed aircraft on station (not to exceed PAA). Aircraft will fill TACC missions as assigned, as such they are considered generated for the inspection. This requirement addresses the intent to assess against DOC and robust OPLAN taskings while recognizing that units do not have all assigned aircraft available to them at all times due to depot maintenance and deployment commitments. Therefore, depot, ISO, CANN/REFURB, and loaned aircraft will not be accelerated during IR; however, units will provide the IG with their plan on how affected aircraft would be accelerated (also applies to SIOP inspections). SIOP/Tanker unit inspections require 100 percent aircraft generation. This SIOP Inspection requirement satisfies the KC-135 IR aircraft generation inspection requirements. If KC-135 units opt for a stand-alone Initial Response Inspection, the unit would be required to generate only those aircraft tasked for deployment or 3 aircraft per squadron, in the case of a stand-alone inspection not tied to a deployment. The IG goal, to avoid additional IG team visits, is to include all IR requirements-aircraft generation, personnel and cargo processing during unit SIOP Inspections.

2.4.7.1.2. The personnel deployment processing requirement is based on the number of personnel in the units' AFWUS-identified UTCs. If there are less than 500 personnel, process 40 percent; from 500 to 1000, process 250; from 1,000 to 1,499 personnel, process 300; from 1,500 to 1,999, process 350; from 2,000 to 2,999, process 425; 3,000 or more personnel, process 500. These sample size groups will permit the IG to inspect the mobility process.

2.4.7.1.3. The cargo deployment processing requirement is based on the short tons of cargo in the AFWUS-identified UTCs. Units process twenty five percent of cargo in conventional UTCs. Note: Due to constantly changing AFWUS, HQ AMC/IG will use an AFWUS cut-off date four months prior to the inspection.

2.4.7.2. Employment. Employment is the safe delivery of passengers, patients, fuel, and cargo to the correct place, in the proper sequence, and on time. Employment taskings include airland, aerial delivery, aerial refueling, aeromedical staging, aeromedical evacuation, and other unique missions. HQ AMC/IG will use METs under Air Force Task # 5 (Provide Rapid Global Mobility) to assess each unit's ability to perform these mission tasks. Inspectors will assign grades based on direct observation of applicable tasks, not by use of unit-provided metrics. Many of these direct observations will take place during actual unit deployments.

2.4.7.3. Mission Support. Mission Support is critical support to facilitate mission accomplishment and directly affects the unit's ability to perform its wartime mission. HQ AMC/IG will use METs under Air Force Task # 6 (Provide Agile Combat Support) to assess each unit's ability to perform these support tasks.

2.4.7.4. Ability-to-Survive-and-Operate (ATSO). ATSO is a unit's ability to protect, sustain, or restore an installation's mission capability. Criteria include: command and control; operations before, during, and after a contingency; plans for hardening/dispersal; detection and warning procedures; reconnaissance team readiness; contamination avoidance procedures; and damage repair, fire protection, and individual protection actions. Supporting tasks are captured in the AMCTL and ATSO criteria are further defined in AMC Pamphlet 90-202, Command Policy Inspection Guide. The IG will inspect ATSO during EORIs IAW para **2.1.3.2.** of this instruction.

2.4.7.5. When the IG assesses a sufficient number of UTCs for Employment and Mission Support (as identified in the inspectable UTC database), and units complete their Initial Response and ATSO requirements, the unit will receive a 5-tier EORI grade. The 5-tier grade is described in AFI 90-201 for each major graded area and an overall 5-tier grade. The IG publishes these grades via a "composite" report.

2.5. EORI Scheduling. HQ AMC/IG will schedule EORIs to maximize inspection opportunity, flexibility, and notification to inspected units. The process will involve a combination of unit input, functional area manager input, and IG scheduling. It should look several years into the future.

2.5.1. Scheduling.

2.5.1.1. To successfully manage OPTEMPO, units should build 30 month (active duty) or 5-year (AFRC and ANG) inspection plan based on their "inspectable" UTCs. Plans should distribute unit functions throughout the inspection cycle and among various EORI vehicles (IGX, deployments, exercises, etc.) with a final IGX being scheduled to complete the units EORI requirements within the prescribed inspection period.

2.5.2. RAT Scheduling.

2.5.2.1. To facilitate scheduling, commanders will review their unit's upcoming deployments and planned exercise schedule and identify, by UTC, inspection opportunities to IG schedulers via the format provided on the HQ AMC/IG homepage. The IG will use this information to schedule these types of inspections. Units should stay engaged with the IG, and if additional opportunities present themselves, the IG will attempt to work last-minute requests when practical.

2.5.2.2. Short-notice contingency operations provide another inspection opportunity, but they present unique challenges. Unit commanders, HQ staffs, NAFs, and the IG should work together to identify as many of these inspection opportunities as possible.

2.5.3. IGX Scheduling.

2.5.3.1. The HQ AMC/IG lists specific UTC requirements for each IGX on its homepage up to 2 years in advance. To participate in IGXs, unit EORI representatives simply E-mail HQ AMC/IG/IGPS and describe which UTCs they want evaluated in a particular IGX. The IG will update the IGX database weekly with UTC information. Units wishing to opt-out of an IGX, once tasked, require active/AFRC NAF/CC or NGB/IGD approval and must submit an alternative inspection proposal with their opt-out request.

2.6. Higher Headquarters. Higher headquarters participation during EORI planning and execution provides for more realistic evaluations. The level of participation by higher headquarters echelons is situation-dependent and determined by the IG in coordination with the HQ AMC staff.

2.7. Core Competencies. HQ AMC re-designed its Operational Readiness Inspection program around the core competencies described in the Air Force Task List (AFTL) and AMCTL. EORI reports should address these core competencies. The following Air Force Tasks (AFT) directly apply to AMC units during EORIs:

2.7.1. Provide Information Superiority (AFT 3).

2.7.2. Provide Global Attack (AFT 4). Note: Only a few tasks apply to AMC.

2.7.3. Provide Rapid Global Mobility (AFT 5).

2.7.4. Provide Agile Combat Support (AFT 6).

2.7.5. Provide Command and Control (AFT 7).

2.8. Common Core Readiness Criteria. AFI 90-201 establishes Common Core Readiness Criteria (CCRC) to ensure MAJCOM inspections adequately evaluate a unit's ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ forces. CCRC areas not adequately addressed in the AMCTL were incorporated into the inspection checklists published in AMCPAM 90-202.

Chapter 3

SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN (SIOP) INSPECTIONS

3.1. General. The purpose of a SIOP Inspection is to assess a unit's capability to accomplish its SIOP taskings within the constraints of a peacetime environment and a limited timeframe. SIOP Inspections will be linked to large-scale exercises or conducted stand-alone. Multiple units may be inspected concurrently; however, each unit will receive their own unit rating, executive outbrief, and report. Only units with SIOP DOC statements will be subject to SIOP Inspections. The guidance in this chapter, combined with the METs in AMCPAM 90-202, will be used to assess a unit's ability to perform its SIOP mission.

3.1.1. Inspection Frequency. The IG schedules SIOP-tasked units for an inspection every 3 years (active duty) or 5 years (Guard and Reserve).

3.1.1.1. Postponement of scheduled inspections or significant tailoring of key inspection activities such as reduced aircraft generation must be considered only as a last resort and be driven by compelling operational need. If a delay beyond the 3/5 year point and/or a significant modification to a full traditional SIOP Inspection are deemed unavoidable, units will submit a request to their respective NAF/CC (Active/AFRC) or NGB/IG (ANG). If approved at that level, the NAF/CC or NGB/IG will forward the package to the Commander, Task Force 294 (TFC-294) with information copy to HQ AMC/IG. TFC-294 will evaluate the request in consultation with the parent headquarters and HQ AMC/IG and either approve, disapprove or tailor the request after coordination with USCINCSTRAT and AMC/CV.

3.2. Responsibilities.

3.2.1. HQ AMC/ DOOC will:

3.2.1.1. Develop an air refueling aircrew SIOP C2 procedures (CCP) test tailored to each inspected unit. Questions deemed critical to executing SIOP missions covering CCP knowledge will be developed and administered.

3.2.1.2. Develop a command post (CP) controller emergency action procedures (EAP) test.

3.2.2. HQ AMC/DOXP will:

3.2.2.1. Develop an air refueling aircrew SIOP general knowledge test (GKT) tailored to each inspected unit.

3.2.3. Inspected units will:

3.2.3.1. Support SIOP CP controller and aircrew testing.

3.2.3.1.1. CP testing will be individual effort. All available controllers certified in SIOP procedures IAW AMCI 10-202, Volume 2, *AMC C2 Responsibilities and Procedures,* will complete testing. Shift-working controllers who are in between mid-shifts (8 or 12 hour) on the day of testing or are scheduled to work their first 12-hour mid-shift on the day of testing are exempt. Controllers coming off their last mid-shift (8 or 12 hour) and starting their break on the day of testing and controllers who are scheduled to work their first 8 hour mid-shift on the day of testing are considered available and will be required to test. Under unusual circumstances and on a case-by-case basis, the IG team chief can waive testing.

3.2.3.1.2. Aircrew testing will be individual crew effort. All available squadron-level SIOP-certified aircrews will complete testing; the IG team chief must approve exceptions on-site. IG inspectors will administer all examinations. If a SIOP-certified navigator helps generate a Pacer CRAG sortie for the inspection, that navigator will test with the rest of the crew.

3.2.3.2. Provide a suitable environment and appropriate security measures for testing and accounting of all classified material when testing is complete. Units will also provide a cassette tape player to assist with administering the aircrew CCP exam. CP controller testing will be conducted in the CP or crisis action team area when possible. Testing will not be accomplished in the console area.

3.2.3.3. Provide the appropriate combat mission folders (CMF), encode/decode documents, communications materials, and other items necessary for SIOP evaluations.

3.3. Major Graded Areas (MGA).

3.3.1. The three MGAs comprising a SIOP Inspection are Unit Generation, Employment, and Mission Support. Each MGA consists of several subareas. Subareas are comprised of METs and their respective clarifications. To determine a MGA rating, each subarea rating is factored into the assessment. Finally, a unit's overall rating will be determined by applying the appropriate weight of each MGA rating.

3.3.2. Unit Generation (UG). This section includes criteria for evaluating the unit's team effort in generating its alert forces in response to SIOP WARNING and ALERT orders, when so directed. This MGA accounts for 40 percent of the unit's overall SIOP grade. This phase of the inspection terminates after the last aircraft is generated. The following subareas will be assessed to determine a unit's overall Unit Generation rating:

3.3.2.1. Command and Control (C2). Senior leaders must demonstrate effective management of unit generation activities to meet mission-timing criteria. Leaders should react appropriately to changes in alert postures and DEFCONs, and generation status boards should reflect accurate information. CP controllers must demonstrate the ability to receive, decode, and validate AMC and USSTRATCOM emergency action message (EAM) traffic (including EAM relay to aircrews when required). Controllers should prioritize and efficiently process messages. Controllers should provide accurate and concise briefings to unit leadership, and alert posture changes should be completed correctly. Communications equipment and Strategic Force Accounting Module (SFAM) reporting should operate effectively and be used correctly, i.e., unit controllers should submit updates to the proper database so reported data correlates to planned data. In addition, SFAM reports should be properly formatted and transmitted as directed in SD 501-14.

3.3.2.2. CP Controller Testing. CP controllers will be evaluated on their knowledge of USSTRATCOM EAP. The CP controller SIOP EAP written examination is a closed-book examination used to evaluate SIOP knowledge of all certified CP controllers. *See Section **3.5.1.***

3.3.2.3. Tanker Strategic Aircraft Regeneration Team (TSART) plans are evaluated for currency, thoroughness, and accuracy. All units with TSART UTCs will be tasked to demonstrate their ability to mobilize/process their personnel and cargo through marshalling.

3.3.2.4. Transportation. Transportation personnel will maintain communications with TCU/ATOC, ensure proper preparation of cargo for airlift, and the safe and timely loading of cargo onto

the proper aircraft. In addition, they will maintain accountability of resources and demonstrate the capability to repair and support vehicles and equipment.

3.3.2.5. Aircraft Generation. Inspected units will generate as tasked to the appropriate scenario-driven alert status in accordance with the applicable USSTRATCOM and AMC instructions.

3.3.2.5.1. Fuel loads are based on peacetime or appropriate requirements. Do not use actual SIOP fuel loads; instead, fuel SIOP aircraft to the next flight schedule fuel load. The hose cart/fuel truck will remain hooked up to the aircraft valve for the time required to pump to the simulated SIOP fuel load or standard ramp fuel loads whichever is applicable.

3.3.2.5.2. Emergency tow or taxi of aircraft will not be performed. Dispatch equipment/personnel to the designated aircraft, run checklists up to the point of starting engines or moving aircraft with a tow vehicle, and stop at that point. Do not start engines and do not tow aircraft. This action should last for designated tow or taxi time.

3.3.2.6. Aircrew Generation. Generate SIOP-certified aircrews to the appropriate alert posture. Aircrews will be current and qualified, and have all appropriate equipment to perform the mission. Aircrew certification and training records will be reviewed for completeness and accuracy.

3.3.2.6.1. Combat mission folders (CMF) should be IAW AMCI 10-450, Volume 2, *KC-135 SIOP Planning,* EAP-STRAT Volume VI, and Tanker Extract Volume II. CP Crew Action Sheets must reflect the unit's current generation status and will be reviewed for completeness and accuracy.

3.3.2.6.2. Intelligence. Evaluate intelligence and tactics support to wing leaders and aircrews. Timely, tailored intelligence on the political and military situation impacting mission generation and execution should be emphasized.

3.3.2.6.3. Local threats (conventional and unconventional) having an impact on the organization's mission generation are analyzed and applicable information disseminated to affected organizations.

3.3.2.6.4. Aircrew briefings should include information on enemy threats, doctrine, weapons capabilities, tactics, and countermeasures applicable to SIOP mission taskings.

3.3.2.6.5. During SIOP generation, life support may simulate the loading of water and rations. The IG may verify proper quantities of assets and issue procedures with the Services facility or appropriate storage function.

3.3.2.6.6. Formation procedures are briefed and employed IAW applicable instructions.

3.3.2.7. Defensive Counterinformation (DCI). This applies to all functional areas. Unit personnel will protect against any enemy action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy information and information function.

3.3.2.8. Safety. Demonstrate proper flight, ground, and weapon safety practices and risk management to accomplish mission requirements safely and effectively.

3.3.3. Employment. This MGA includes criteria for evaluating the organization's team effort in executing its alert forces in response to SIOP execution orders, when so directed. This phase of the inspection begins after the last aircraft is generated. Organizations are assessed on their ability to respond to aircraft, start engines, and launch (if tasked) to meet mission-timing requirements. The sce-

nario will lead to aircraft recovery or a conclusion to SIOP operations. This MGA accounts for 40 percent of the unit's overall SIOP grade. The following subareas will be assessed to determine the unit's overall employment rating:

3.3.3.1. Command and Control (C2). Senior leaders must demonstrate effective management of unit execution activities to meet mission-timing criteria. Leadership should react appropriately to changes in alert postures and Force Protection Levels. CP controllers should provide positive coordination to all functional areas during contingency/wartime posture for SIOP operations. Controllers must demonstrate the ability to receive, decode, and validate SIOP message traffic including message relay to aircrews when required. Controllers should provide accurate and concise briefings to unit leaders and ensure alert posture changes are completed correctly. Communications equipment should be used correctly and the SFAM database should reflect accurate information. Controllers should submit LERTCON Status of Actions Reports IAW AMCI 10-202, Volume 5, and demonstrate SART reporting IAW SD 501-14.

3.3.3.2. Aircrew Testing. Results of the aircrew CCP and GKT will be used to help determine overall SIOP employment capability. See Sections ***3.5.2.*** and ***3.5.3.***

3.3.3.3. Mission Execution. This subarea consists of the alert aircraft repositioning plan (AARP), the alert force exercise (AFE), and aircraft regeneration (servicing) exercise. The AFE will evaluate a unit's capability to respond within appropriate response timing and its ability to meet mission requirements. Following the AFE, IG maintenance inspectors will randomly select one or two crews to demonstrate their familiarity with servicing/regenerating their aircraft. Typically aircrew testing occurs after the aircraft uncocking following the AFE. If the airfield environment permits, units will demonstrate their AARP capability to reposition their aircraft in a timely manner and provide adequate aircrew support. As a minimum, units will brief their AARP and inspectors will review the plan, to include agreements between host/tenant units or civilian airfield authorities; however, actual demonstration of AARP is desired.

3.3.3.4. Defensive Counterinformation (DCI). All personnel must protect information against any enemy action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy information and information functions.

3.3.3.5. Safety. All personnel will be evaluated on their ability to perform their tasks in a safe manner. The SIOP Inspection is not a valid reason for any individual to perform any task in an unsafe manner.

3.3.4. Mission Support (MS). This MGA includes criteria for evaluating the organization's team effort in supporting and sustaining its alert forces. This area encompasses a wide range of specialties. Units will be assessed on their ability to provide internal C2, security, and communications support for alert combat-ready aircrews, support personnel, and weapons systems in a safe and professional manner. This MGA accounts for 20 percent of the unit's overall SIOP grade. The following subareas will be assessed to determine the overall MS rating:

3.3.4.1. Command and Control (C2). Provide positive direction and coordination to all functional areas during the transition from peacetime to contingency/wartime posture for SIOP operations. Timely cross-functional coordination and interaction should occur between leadership, work centers, and higher headquarters units to accomplish taskings.

3.3.4.2. Security Forces. Inspect alert force aircraft, facilities, and communications for security commensurate with the protection level of the resource IAW AFI 31-101, *The Air Force Installation Security Program*. All unit personnel are responsible for security awareness.

3.3.4.3. Services. Alert force support must be sustainable for extended periods of time. Evaluate the overall unit plan to prepare alert force facilities. Dining and lodging facilities must be adequate to support alert force personnel for sustained operations. If LIMFACs preclude assessing a specific support subarea, the IG team chief may approve limited "timeout" periods and/or evaluation of support and sustainment plans only.

3.3.4.4. Communications and Information. Establish, maintain, and operate communications equipment/systems for alert operations.

3.3.4.5. Defensive Counterinformation (DCI). Unit personnel will implement proper OPSEC procedures; exercise proper Information Security, including proper management and control of classified documents; practice effective COMSEC; follow COMPUSEC guidance; and establish physical security of facilities, equipment, and information.

3.3.4.6. Safety. Demonstrate proper safety practices and risk management to accomplish mission requirements in a safe, effective, and timely manner.

3.4. Grading. Grading criteria is based on demonstrated capabilities and results of observed performance wherever possible. A unit's overall SIOP Inspection rating will be based on a 5-tier grading system, with the unit being rated Outstanding, Excellent, Satisfactory, Marginal, or Unsatisfactory. The MGAs and subareas are given 5 tier grades; supporting subarea tasks (METs) are given 3-tier grades (GREEN – Mission Ready, LIGHT GREEN - Mission Ready, but with comments requiring action or attention) or RED – Not Mission Ready). Subareas consist of supporting METs which may consist of further criteria or clarifications. OPLAN requirements, directives, and instructions are benchmarks to which the METs are applied.

3.5. Testing. SIOP Inspection examinations consist of a CP controller SIOP EAP test, an aircrew SIOP GKT, and an aircrew CCP test. Examinations will not be critiqued to 100 percent. Command post and aircrew test results will be published in the inspection report and will be provided to HQ AMC/DOXP and DOOC.

3.5.1. CP Controller Testing. The CP controller SIOP EAP written examination is a closed-book examination evaluating SIOP knowledge of all certified CP controllers. Minimum passing score will be 90 percent. This is a 50-question test with all questions designated critical and equal. To determine the overall rating for CP Controller testing, the following criteria will apply.

3.5.1.1. CP Controller Testing Grade determination: If all CP controllers score 90 percent or above on the closed-book examination, use the following criteria based on average test score:

100 – 98.0	Outstanding
97.9 – 94.0	Excellent
93.9 – 90.0	Satisfactory

NOTE: If any CP controller fails to achieve the minimum passing score, use the following criteria based on the percentage of controllers that passed compared to the number of controllers tested:

99.9 – 85.0	Satisfactory

84.9 – 70.0	Marginal
69.9 or Below	Unsatisfactory

3.5.2. Aircrew Testing:

3.5.2.1. Aircrew GKT. The aircrew SIOP GKT is an open-book examination consisting of 33 questions. Minimum passing score is 85 percent.

3.5.3. Aircrew CCP Test. The Aircrew Command and Control Procedures (CCP) examination is an open book examination using only the materials from the CMF to evaluate aircrew members knowledge of CCP procedures. Materials other than those contained in the CMF will not be used for the examination. Minimum passing score is 100 percent. The unit grade for the CCP exam is determined by pass/fail criteria: Satisfactory (100 percent pass rate) or Unsatisfactory (any failure).

3.5.4. Results of the aircrew general knowledge and CCP tests will not be combined to determine the overall rating for the Aircrew Testing sub-area under Employment.

3.5.5. Aircrew Testing Grade Determination. The overall aircrew testing grade is determined by the average score on the GKTs, rounded to the nearest tenth of a percent. Use the appropriate method below based upon aircrew testing results.

3.5.5.1. No Failures: If all aircrews score 85 percent or above on the general knowledge test and 100 percent on the CCP test, use the following criteria based on average GKT score:

100 – 99.5	Outstanding
99.4 – 97.0	Excellent
96.9 – 90.0	Satisfactory
89.9 – 85.0	Marginal

NOTE: If any aircrew fails to achieve the minimum passing score on either the CCP or GKT, use the following criteria based on the percentage of aircrew that passed compared to the number of aircrew tested:

99.9 – 85.0	Satisfactory
84.9 – 70.0	Marginal
69.9 or Below	Unsatisfactory

3.6. Corrective Actions. Units that receive marginal or unsatisfactory grades for any of their graded areas must take immediate action to correct major discrepancies. The inspected unit commander must also submit a corrective action plan to their respective NAF/CC (Active/AFRC) or NGB/IG (ANG). If approved at that level, the NAF/CC or NGB/IG will forward the package to the Commander, Task Force 294 (TFC-294) with information copy to HQ AMC/IG. TFC-294 will evaluate the plan and either approve, disapprove or direct changes to the plan after coordination with USCINCSTRAT and AMC/CV.

3.6.1. HQ AMC/IGCY will officially notify inspected units of the suspense for submitting corrective action plans; normally 10 working days after the IG signs the inspection report.

3.6.2. Re-inspection. Areas that receive a marginal or unsatisfactory grade may be re-inspected at the direction of the AMC/CC, AMC/CV, TFC-294 or NAF/CC (active or Reserve as appropriate) and

NGB/IG for ANG-unique items. HQ AMC/IG will notify the unit of re-inspection requirements. Grades in the IG database will not be changed, allowing the IG to trend problem areas.

Chapter 4

NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTIONS (NSI)

4.1. General. This chapter outlines AMC inspection criteria applicable to all prime nuclear airlift force (PNAF) wings, AMC Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units, AMC nuclear airlift support (NAS) bases, and nuclear-capable units supporting a nuclear mission.

NOTE: This chapter does not apply to ANG and AFRC units.

4.1.1. The administrative OPR for this chapter is HQ AMC/IGC. The development of inspection criteria for this instruction is the responsibility of the affected functional managers. HQ AMC/SEW is the command focal point for the Nuclear Surety Program.

4.1.2. Affected units, NAFs, and interested AMC staff agencies will review this chapter at least once a year. Send recommendations for improvements to this chapter through command channels to HQ AMC/IGC at least 3 months before the instruction's annual revision. HQ AMC/IGC will coordinate all changes prior to publication.

4.1.3. HQ AMC/IG Assigned Responsibilities: Conduct inspections required by this chapter. If written tests are given, follow this guidance: Tests may be given to available supervisors and qualified PNAF crewmembers. Tests are used in evaluating the overall knowledge and qualifications of supervisors and PNAF aircrew members. Tests include, but are not limited to, questions based on AFI 11-299, *Nuclear Airlift Operations*, IC-XXX-16-1/2, T.O. 11N-45-51A, B, and C, AFI 36-2104, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program*, AFI 91-101*, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*, and AFJI 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials*. HQ AMC/DOO, in coordination with HQ AMC/DOV, will develop a Master Question Bank (MQB) for PNAF aircrew tests. The IG will select 25 questions from the MQB for the aircrew tests during the NSI/INSI. As a minimum, aircrew tests will address the two-person concept, security, emergency procedures, PRP, and responsibilities during nuclear cargo onload and offloading. Aircraft commanders and couriers are tested on cargo custody procedures. The minimum passing score is 85 percent.

4.1.3.1. Send a message report on all nuclear surety inspections IAW AFI 90-201, **Attachment 2** and **Attachment 3**. Reports should be clear and concise. They should include significant details on all LIMFACs, critical and major deficiencies identified, and any deficiency or unusual situation that impacts the unit mission.

4.1.3.2. Provide the inspected unit a report which is detailed enough to facilitate unit corrective actions and contains references for all deficiencies cited. Make this report available within 30 days after the inspection.

4.1.3.3. Prepare criteria for NSIs. Criteria must cover all applicable functions as listed in the USAF Program, Nuclear Weapons Capabilities and Equipage Document, and AFI 90-201, paragraph 3.5. Send one copy of proposed criteria to HQ USAF/XONO, Washington DC 20330-5000, HQ AFSC/SEW, 9700 Avenue G, SE, Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5000, and SAF/IGI, Washington DC 20330-1000.

4.1.3.4. Develop inspection checklists, with references, for NSIs. Send one copy of checklists and changes to HQ AFSC/SEW, 9700 Avenue G, SE, Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5000.

4.2. Policy and Procedures. Evaluate a unit's management of nuclear resources by comparing unit performance against approved safety, security, and reliability standards. HQ AMC/IG will conduct the following types of inspections: indirect nuclear support capabilities, initial nuclear surety, nuclear surety, and limited nuclear surety (paragraphs **4.3. 4.4. 4.5.** and **4.6.**). General policies that apply during nuclear surety inspections are:

4.2.1. The military importance and political sensitivity of operations with nuclear weapons dictate that all units and personnel maintain the highest possible standards of performance. The inspection system for nuclear weapons must be professional and thorough so that the nuclear capability of each unit is assured. Since there is no way to reduce the rating system to a formula, the final rating awarded must be based on the nature, severity, and number of deficiencies noted during the inspection. In addition, discussion with unit personnel and judgment by the inspection team are essential in determining a final rating. A letter to HQ AMC/IGP should identify LIMFACs that may affect an inspection at least 4 weeks prior to the inspection.

4.2.1.1. Inspectors will analyze all deficiencies to determine root causes and identify the proper OPR for corrective action. In those cases where the cause of the deficiency is an isolated incident of an individual to perform in spite of adequate training, cite the cause as "personal error." This allows a distinction between systemic deficiencies and unrelated personal deficiencies, which are not the result of an inadequate nuclear surety program. Identification of a deficiency as personal error may or may not affect the area rating.

4.2.1.2. Deficiencies, which do not directly affect the safety, reliability, or security of a nuclear weapon, are not appropriate for inclusion in the surety inspection report.

4.2.2. The inspection team will evaluate an airlift unit that has a nuclear weapon transport mission by observing loading, custody transfer procedures, transporting, and unloading of representative types of weapons. The inspection (other than an INSI) may be conducted during war reserve (WR) missions. The inspection team will not require the unit to perform additional weapon-handling operations if a WR mission is evaluated.

4.2.2.1. Do not use WR weapons for exercises or inspections conducted while personnel are wearing complete chemical ensembles. Removal of the gas mask and gloves is mandatory to ensure that weapons are not inadvertently damaged.

4.2.2.2. Personnel will use training units per AFI 11-299, Table 2.2, for all INSIs. Training units or weapon system simulators may be used for other inspections when WR assets are not available. Use assigned EOD trainers or other appropriate trainers for evaluating EOD render-safe and disposal procedures. If training weapons or weapon system simulators are used, those security, maintenance, and safety directives that apply to WR assets are applicable unless waived by the inspection team.

4.2.3. An inspector may not be considered part of a unit's two-person concept team at any time during an inspection, except in an actual emergency. During airlift missions and when unescorted entry to restricted areas is authorized, two inspectors that are certified under the personnel reliability program (PRP) may form their own two-person concept team.

4.2.4. Each NSI at a Primary Nuclear Airlift Support Base will include the conduct and evaluation of a Major Accident Response Exercise (MARE) to evaluate the units' procedures to respond to accidents and incidents involving nuclear weapons to include the availability of a trained and equipped Base Disaster Response Force.

4.3. Indirect Nuclear Support Capabilities Inspections (INSCI). An INSCI is designed to evaluate an EOD unit's capability to maintain technical data, specialized equipment, and training to perform an initial evaluation of a nuclear accident/incident and emergency render-safe procedures of a nuclear weapon. All AMC EOD teams must maintain an indirect nuclear support capability, as a minimum. INSCIs are normally accomplished during HQ AMC/CEX staff assistance visits.

4.4. Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections (INSI). Conduct an INSI to evaluate a unit's readiness to assume or resume a nuclear mission. In all cases, conduct the INSI using training units before WR weapons are placed at the unit or facility. INSIs are prior notice inspections.

4.4.1. INSI Criteria.

4.4.1.1. During an INSI, the inspection team evaluates a unit's capability to receive, store, transport, secure, and render-safe nuclear weapons safely and reliably as applicable to the unit mission.

4.4.1.2. EOD teams (direct support units) and nuclear logistic airlift units must receive an INSI before they are considered capable of supporting a nuclear mission. This inspection establishes a unit's readiness to assume the nuclear mission.

4.4.1.3. Phased INSIs may be conducted when large scale, time-consuming efforts are involved. If this option is used, HQ AMC/IGP must prepare an inspection plan to ensure all required areas are initially inspected. Submit this plan to HQ AFSC/SEW and HQ USAF/XONO for approval. A rating of "ready" must be assigned to each phase of the INSI before that portion of nuclear operations may be conducted. After all phases of the INSI are completed and all functional areas are rated "ready," a follow-up LNSI is required in accordance with paragraph **4.6.3.**

4.4.2. Notification. Notify the commander of the unit preparing to assume the PNAF mission, by letter, NLT 30 days prior to the INSI date.

4.4.2.1. Conduct the inspection under the most realistic conditions possible. Each unit functional area will give INSI missions the same priority handling and support required for actual nuclear airlift missions. Keep simulations during the inspection to a minimum.

4.4.2.2. The inspection team provides simulated mission directives as the basis for load requirements, briefings, route structures, and required messages. The inspection team chief determines disposal of classified or simulated classified messages.

4.4.2.3. The team chief directs a minimum of two simulated PNAF missions. Each aircrew demonstrates onload and offload procedures. Evaluate the simulated missions as if they are actual peacetime nuclear airlift missions. Aircraft selected for simulated missions will meet the criteria in AFI 11-299. The team chief must approve all waivers and may select aircrew members and direct additional exercise missions as necessary.

4.4.2.4. Use nuclear training shape(s) during the inspection. However, once an exercise onload begins, treat the training shape(s) as WR weapons until all onload and offload operations are complete. The loading phase of each evaluation starts with the shipper's briefing or when the nuclear training shape(s) are put into the restricted area around the aircraft, whichever occurs first. Security and safety directives for WR weapons apply when the onload starts. Entry control procedures are required for the aircraft restricted area. The team chief will direct any additional security measures in accordance with AFI 31-101.

4.4.2.5. Within 90 days after a unit receives a "ready" rating on an INSI, conduct an LNSI on at least one nuclear airlift mission.

4.4.3. EOD. Each EOD unit receives an INSI prior to assuming direct support of a nuclear weapons unit. EOD bases hosting an operational nuclear tenant or otherwise tasked to a direct nuclear mission, will receive an NSI at least once every 18 months. The inspection may be a phased NSI if the inspection is completed within 90 days of initiation, but not later than 18 months after completing the last NSI. For selected EOD units, the administrative and operational phases will be scheduled as close together as possible. When EOD inspectors conduct an inspection in separate segments at different locations, they will submit a report after completing each part of the inspection.

4.5. Nuclear Surety Inspections (NSI). An NSI is designed to evaluate a unit's capability to manage nuclear resources. Evaluate all applicable areas in paragraph **4.7.**

4.5.1. Frequency. PNAF bases and NAS bases will receive an NSI at least once every 18 months. The inspection may be a phased NSI if the inspection is completed within 90 days of initiation, but not later than 18 months after completing the last NSI. For PNAF units, the administrative (base support) and operational (flying) phases will be scheduled as close together as possible. PNAF units will not receive an NSI in conjunction with an EORI.

4.5.2. (Limited/Minimum) No-notice NSIs. The team chief presents an inspection authority letter and an EAL to the unit commander when the team arrives at the installation, to include PNAF operational mission inspections. These documents must be presented to the commander before conducting any portion of the inspection. If the team arrives during non-duty hours, the unit commander should be reached through the unit command and control facility. When PNAF missions are joined en route, notify TACC/XOO, HQ AMC/DO (or the appropriate HQ AMC approving authority), parent AMC NAF, and wing and squadron commanders by message. During MINIMIZE, mark messages in accordance with AFMAN 33-326, *Preparing Official Communications*. Inspectors must have orders that include authority for either additional aircrew member (ACM) or mission essential ground personnel (MEGP) status on nuclear missions and the PRP status of the inspectors. Inspectors will form their own two-person concept teams and will not normally attach themselves to inspected unit two-person concept teams. Do not allow unit personnel to attach themselves to IG two-person concept teams.

4.5.3. Conduct INSIs, NSIs and LNSIs of AMC EOD units with direct support missions in accordance with this section.

4.5.4. For PNAF units, conduct the flying portion of an NSI during actual WR nuclear airlift missions. Inspections during airlift of trainers are authorized only in unusual cases when actual WR airlift missions are not scheduled for an extended period of time. Evaluate a minimum of one nuclear airlift mission. For NAS units, conduct at least one exercise to measure the unit's capability to support a PNAF mission.

4.5.5. If a unit is rated "Unsatisfactory," the unit may not perform functions with nuclear weapons in those areas rated "Unsatisfactory" without the approval of the AMC/CC. Inspectors will not be used to provide training. An NSI or LNSI must be accomplished within 90 days after a unit is rated "Unsatisfactory" on an NSI.

4.5.6. If one aircrew's performance is unsatisfactory, the team chief may immediately re-inspect by observing additional missions. If observed aircrew deficiencies warrant, the team chief may re-inspect

using the procedures in AFI 90-201. In all cases of unsatisfactory performance, the team chief may request replacement of any or all aircrew members.

4.6. Limited Nuclear Surety Inspections (LNSI). An LNSI is limited in scope and does not evaluate all NSI areas applicable to the unit. An LNSI does not alter the 18-month NSI requirement. LNSIs may be conducted for a variety of reasons:

4.6.1. Inspect one or more areas designated by the AMC/CC, SAF/IG, or HQ AMC/IG.

4.6.2. Re-inspect a unit in those areas that receive an Unsatisfactory rating during an NSI.

4.6.3. Certify a unit assigned a nuclear contingency mission before deployment. An LNSI may be conducted only if the unit has previously received an INSI/NSI and the 18-month certification period has not expired. If the certification period has expired, an INSI must be conducted.

4.6.4. Conduct the required inspection within 90 days of successful completion of an INSI.

4.7. Criteria. This paragraph details the basic criteria for NSIs. All NSI areas listed below, which are applicable to the unit's mission, must be inspected during NSIs. Selected areas may be inspected during LNSIs and INSIs. NSI areas are designed to address all functional areas or operations. Consider pass/fail criteria when assessing any deficiency (see T.O. 11N-25-1 for additional information). Inspectors will use the checklists in the AMC Inspection Guide.

4.7.1. Pass/Fail Criteria. The criteria listed below are pass/fail for NSIs. Areas rated “Unsatisfactory” under pass/fail criteria may be re-inspected prior to inspection team departure. If the area(s) is not re-inspected to at least a “Marginal” level, the inspected unit must discontinue that portion of the operation until re-inspected or corrective measures are implemented and approved by AMC/CC.

4.7.1.1. Safety. Safety encompasses all requirements and procedures to ensure a safe environment is provided for nuclear weapons. Failure of the inspection will result if a deficiency could cause explosion, radioactive contamination, unintentional operation of all or part of the weapon arming/firing system, or physical damage to the weapon in a manner that would lead to weapon rejection, violation on nuclear weapons system safety rules, or using handling or tiedown equipment which is unserviceable, unauthorized, or has not received mandatory load testing or safety-related inspections.

4.7.1.2. Security. Security encompasses all the requirements and procedures accomplished by all agencies to provide a secure environment for nuclear weapons. Failure of the inspection will result if the unit does not provide required security for a nuclear weapon or permits close proximity to the weapon by unauthorized personnel, or from a number of deficiencies or performance indicating a lack of competence or disregard for prescribed procedures. Other examples of security violations are listed in T.O. 11N-25-1, paragraphs 3-2.3.3.1 through 3-2.3.3.6.

4.7.1.3. Access. This applies to weapons and certified critical components. Evaluate the unit’s ability to meet reliability program standards and/or certification procedures for personnel eligible for assignment to duties to control, handle, have access to, or control access to nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon systems.

4.7.1.4. Resource Availability. Evaluate whether or not the inspected unit has the required resources to accomplish its nuclear mission.

4.7.1.5. A number of deficiencies or a manner of performance in any or all areas that indicate a lack of competence or a disregard for prescribed procedures will cause failure of the inspection.

4.7.1.6. Inspection Deficiencies. Respond IAW AFI 90-201, Attachment 3.

4.7.1.6.1. Critical Deficiency. Any deficiency resulting in an "Unsatisfactory" rating for the specific area and an overall unit "Unsatisfactory" rating as defined in T.O. 11N-25-1, Section 3.

4.7.1.6.2. Major Deficiency. A deficiency that requires immediate, answerable action by the unit or higher agency to prevent an unreliable weapon, or unsafe or insecure environment. The deficiency may cause a unit to be rated "Unsatisfactory" in one or more inspection areas not defined as critical under overall unit pass/fail criteria.

4.7.1.6.3. Area(s) for Improvement. Any deficiency that does not meet the definition for a critical or major deficiency.

4.7.1.7. Deficiency Categories. The two categories of deficiencies for reporting and scoring purposes will be referred to as Findings and Recommended Improvement Areas. Critical and Major Deficiencies will be identified as Findings. All other deficiencies will be categorized as Recommended Improvement Areas.

4.7.1.8. For AFSC/SEW data tracking purposes, all Critical and Major Deficiencies will be assigned a cause code in the inspection report. Only the primary contributing cause code will be assigned against the deficiency. Each cause code is listed as follows:

4.7.1.8.1. Oversight. Errors in leadership or supervision at any level.

4.7.1.8.2. Experience. Errors committed despite adequate training, oversight, and guidance.

4.7.1.8.3. Guidance. Inadequate, confusing, or specific written direction that is contradictory or prevents adequate accomplishment of the task.

4.7.1.8.4. Training. Individuals inadequately trained/prepared to accomplish the task.

4.7.1.8.5. Equipment. Support equipment unavailable, inadequate, or inoperable due to circumstances beyond the unit's control. (Problems within the unit's control would fall under one of the other areas.)

4.7.1.8.6. Other. Isolated events involving deficient actions of individuals not attributable to any of the previous causes.

4.7.2. AMC NSI Areas. An "Unsatisfactory" rating in one of the following areas does not automatically result in an overall unit rating of "Unsatisfactory" unless it violates the pass/fail criteria. To provide a single source of consolidated inspection guidance, this paragraph combines USAF inspection requirements with DoD guidance extracted from T.O. 11N-25-1.

4.7.2.1. Management and Administration.

4.7.2.1.1. Management. The effectiveness of the nuclear surety program depends largely on the leadership, guidance, and attitude of the unit commander and key supervisors. The NSI team must determine whether deficiencies resulted from an individual's error or reflect management or supervisory errors or omissions.

4.7.2.1.1.1. Wing and squadron supervisory personnel involvement and observation of the PNAF mission.

4.7.2.1.1.2. Qualified PNAF supervisory personnel support the unit in aircrew standardization at the required levels.

4.7.2.1.2. Administration. Deficiencies identified throughout the inspection are not the sole basis for determining the overall rating for the nuclear surety program. Key to this determination is the inspector's evaluation of whether the deficiency was the result of inadequate program management by wing or subordinate-level functional managers or due to the failure of an individual to follow established procedures.

4.7.2.1.2.1. Nuclear Surety Program. Evaluate compliance, programs, and management per AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program* and AFI 11-299, *Nuclear Airlift Operations.*

4.7.2.1.2.1.1. Safety. The inspection shall be conducted to ensure the adequacy of the following: Compliance with the two-person concept, safety requirements/precautions specified in pertinent directives, and general safety practices. The chief of safety ensures the appointment of a nuclear surety manager (NSM) in accordance with AFI 91-101, and ensures the nuclear surety program is administered in accordance with AFI 91-101.

4.7.2.1.2.1.2. NSM is responsible for the following:

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.1. Reviews the currency and adequacy of unit nuclear airlift support plans, operating orders, and instructions annually and ensures compliance with AFJI 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials*, and AFI 11-299. Ensures actions taken to eliminate approved exceptions, waivers, and deviations; for example, nonstandard safety, security, and storage conditions.

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.2. Communicates with appropriate base agencies and is the central point of contact for all nuclear surety matters.

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.3. Flies on nuclear airlift missions quarterly in accordance with AFI 91-101 (*PNAF bases only*).

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.4. Ensures nuclear mishaps and DULL SWORDs are reported and investigated in accordance with AFI 91-204, *Safety Investigations and Reports*.

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.5. Monitors wing PRP in accordance with AFI 36-2104 and AFI 91-101 (AMC1).

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.6. Is familiar with security standards for nuclear airlift and reviews base security programs and procedures annually.

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.7. Conducts annual NSIs in accordance with AFI 91-101 as supplemented.

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.8. Ensures education and training of all required individuals on nuclear matters are in accordance with AFI 91-101 and AFI 11-299.

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.9. Ensures a wing Nuclear Surety Council/Working Group is established and meets as directed by the wing commander. Ensures published minutes are available to all attendees.

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.10. Ensures required up-to-date directives, instructions, and manuals applicable to the scope of the Nuclear Surety Program are maintained.

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.11. Unit Standard Operating Procedures/Plans/Instructions implementing DoD and USAF requirements in the areas of security and safety.

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.12. Organizational listing of personnel assigned nuclear weapons duties, including security forces.

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.13. Required records properly maintained and evidence of timely submission of reports.

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.14. Status of approved waivers, exemptions, deviations, and exceptions.

4.7.2.1.2.1.2.15. A squadron nuclear airlift monitor is appointed in accordance with AFI 11-299.

4.7.2.2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD).

4.7.2.2.1. Phase I unit management focuses on general support programs, equipment, and practical exercises conducted at the home base. This phase applies to all direct and indirect support mission tasked units. It may be conducted during an EORI. Indirect support tasked units must be inspected at least every 3 years. Indirect support inspections may be conducted during NSIs, SIOP Inspections, or as stand-alone inspections.

4.7.2.2.2. Phase II technical application is a demonstration performance evaluation of render-safe procedures (RSP) and continuation of RSP on type 3B or other suitable trainer(s). Because training weapons are not available at AMC bases, the EOD functional manager will schedule the use of trainers through other Air Force bases. HQ AMC/IGI will task the inspected unit by message. Phase II applies to all AMC-direct support units. These inspections are conducted every 18 months, usually the month prior to the NSI.

4.7.2.2.3. Inspect the unit using the most current HQ AMC EOD NSI checklist.

4.7.2.2.3.1. A less than "Satisfactory" rating (or failure in an INSCI) is warranted for deficiencies observed or noted in response, technical knowledge, task proficiency, publications, or equipment as applicable. An unsafe or unreliable RSP/CP or violation of a technical order WARNING will be cause for an "Unsatisfactory" rating (or failure in an INSCI).

4.7.2.3. Security. Evaluate the unit's ability to provide a secure environment for nuclear resources during normal and advanced FP conditions in compliance with security requirements as defined in DoD, AF, and AMC directives.

4.7.2.3.1. Exercise scenarios. Any IG or Exercise Evaluation Team (EET)-driven exercises should be used to judge the effectiveness of security forces' reaction to emergencies. The following apply:

4.7.2.3.1.1. Ensure that WR weapons are not involved in security exercise scenarios. Scenarios developed for testing the reaction of the security force, including the deployment of response forces, may include training weapons.

4.7.2.3.1.2. Test the capability of the response force (RF) to meet established time criteria for each nuclear area. To preclude a strict "stopwatch" mentality of testing the RF, the time should not commence until an initial situational assessment reveals an emergency is in progress and deployment of the RF is required.

4.7.2.3.1.3. Use the AMC threat assessment for the simulated threat condition or other contingency security operations.

4.7.2.3.2. Normal Security. Inspect the physical security system for areas that contain nuclear-laden aircraft. If minimum-security standards are not met, then approved security criteria deviations and compensatory measures must be in effect. Evaluate all elements of the security system to determine the capability to prevent unauthorized entry to areas containing nuclear weapons and prevent close proximity to nuclear weapons and systems. The inspection must determine the capability to process authorized individuals into restricted areas to meet mission requirements. Evaluate these elements:

4.7.2.3.2.1. The physical security barriers and procedures (clear zones, fencing, security lighting, warning signs, emergency power source, vegetation, grills, and grate openings).

4.7.2.3.2.2. Entry control procedures (rosters, circulation, duress, escort, badge system, package, material, and vehicle control, and emergency entry procedures).

4.7.2.3.2.3. Performance of security personnel (detection and assessment capability, knowledge of required weapons and actions, availability and capability of security forces to effectively respond to and neutralize incidents and alarms, equipment, and quality of performance of required actions).

4.7.2.3.2.4. The base's response to a peacetime terrorist attack. The evaluation should determine how effectively base resources are used to defend against overt attacks on areas where nuclear weapons or weapon systems are located or when nuclear weapons are in convoy. Use realistic scenarios that are based on DoD postulated and AMC FP assessment and locally devised exercise scenarios. The evaluation considers:

4.7.2.3.2.4.1. The base's assessment of the threat.

4.7.2.3.2.4.2. The effectiveness of the planning, training, and exercising of applicable base activities to counter terrorist actions.

4.7.2.3.2.4.3. The use of available base resources to counter or recover from a terrorist attack.

4.7.2.3.2.4.4. The Command, Control, and Communications (C3) of all forces involved.

4.7.2.3.2.4.5. The implementation of the base antiterrorist/force protection plan.

4.7.2.3.2.4.6. Force Protection Condition (FPCON) Posture. Observe the unit's ability to effectively transition from normal to advanced FPCON postures. Determine the unit's ability to effectively provide a secure environment for nuclear resources located

in weapon storage and alert areas, during breakout, convoy, and loading operations, or when dispersed.

4.7.2.3.3. Aircrew Security:

4.7.2.3.3.1. Aircrew courier team is armed in accordance with AFI 11-299.

4.7.2.3.3.2. Aircraft is sanitized prior to onload of nuclear cargo.

4.7.2.3.3.3. At least one armed aircrew member provides Type II security when required.

4.7.2.3.3.4. Aircrew side arms will be controlled in accordance with AFI 11-299, when not providing Type I security.

4.7.2.3.3.5. On arrival and departure, the courier team deploys and provides security in accordance with AFI 11-299.

4.7.2.3.3.6. The courier coordinates security with host-base security forces to ensure proper entry control into the restricted area around the aircraft.

4.7.2.3.3.7. The aircrew ensures the aircraft is properly sealed in accordance with AFI 11-299, when required.

4.7.2.3.3.8. The aircrew understands emergency security procedures (i.e., duress codes, hijacking attempts, airborne interception, hostile attack, emergency diversion, and ground evacuation location in case of a fire or hot brakes).

4.7.2.3.4. Security Forces. Provide appropriate security support in accordance with AFI 31-101, DoD 5210.41M (C), the Air Force Supplement to DoD 5210.41M (C), and AFI 11-299. AMC bases with a nuclear airlift support (NAS) mission will be responsible for all of the following.

4.7.2.3.4.1. Appropriate security forces are posted.

4.7.2.3.4.2. The required equipment and physical security aids are available and the restricted area is established in accordance with AFI 31-101 and DoD 5210.41M (C).

4.7.2.3.4.3. Evaluate all physical security requirements for the protection of nuclear weapons.

4.7.2.3.4.4. Security forces personnel engaged in duties directly associated with nuclear weapons must be certified under the PRP in accordance with DoD 5210.42.

4.7.2.3.4.5. Conduct at least one terrorist FP exercise, which requires the security force to demonstrate its capability to counter or neutralize the terrorist threat, and recapture a seized nuclear weapon.

4.7.2.3.4.6. C3 capabilities of the security forces and other base agencies.

4.7.2.3.4.7. Security forces tactics and employment of weapons.

4.7.2.3.4.8. Alerting and notification procedures of the disaster response force.

4.7.2.3.4.9. Recall and employment of backup force.

4.7.2.3.4.10. Alerting of augmentation force.

4.7.2.3.4.11. Submission of COVERED WAGON, BENT SPEAR, EMPTY QUIVER, and BROKEN ARROW reports, as appropriate. *NOTE*: The terrorist threat exercise will satisfy the requirement for implementation of the FPCONs.

4.7.2.3.5. Develop and exercise appropriate FPCONs in support of nuclear operations, to include:

4.7.2.3.5.1. Tailoring FPCONs to meet base/AMC threat assessment and local situation/ terrain.

4.7.2.3.5.2. Realistic augmentation force tasking.

4.7.2.3.5.3. Adequate training of security forces to support the nuclear mission (includes critical certifications and other quality control evaluations). Accomplish nuclear surety training in accordance with AFI 91-101.

4.7.2.3.5.4. Sufficient security forces vehicles and equipment.

4.7.2.3.5.5. Properly trained and certified explosive detector dogs to sanitize nuclear airlift missions.

4.7.2.3.5.6. Demonstration by the explosive detector dog handlers and security supervisors of the proper procedures in sanitizing aircraft.

4.7.2.4. PRP. The purpose of this evaluation is to ensure commanders and appointed PRP monitors are knowledgeable of and in compliance with the requirements and responsibilities outlined in AFI 36-2104 and command supplements. All agencies involved in PRP management must be evaluated to determine effectiveness of program controls. Although a 100 percent records audit of personnel and medical records is appropriate for small PRP populations (less than 100), a targeted sample of the unit PRP records may be evaluated for larger populations. The sample will include records considered most likely to reveal problems plus an additional sample that assures each organization with people on PRP is evaluated.

4.7.2.4.1. Base an Unsatisfactory rating on any of the following:

4.7.2.4.2. Failure to adequately screen individuals against standards and selection criteria, resulting in an unreliable individual being PRP certified.

4.7.2.4.3. Failure to pass to the unit commander any potentially disqualifying information on a PRP-certified individual, which, if known, would have resulted in a de-certification.

4.7.2.4.4. Failure by a PRP member to notify the unit commander of potentially disqualifying information, resulting in an unreliable individual performing nuclear-related duties.

4.7.2.4.5. Failure by a unit commander to decertify an individual who is either suspected of, or confirmed as, being unreliable.

4.7.2.4.6. A non-certified individual performs nuclear-related duties requiring PRP certification.

4.7.2.4.7. If a unit has self-identified a deficiency prior to the inspection and sufficiently corrected it, consider that situation when assessing deficiencies and assigning ratings, taking into account the unit's discovery and correction. Consider other factors prior to assigning a rating, such as how recently the discrepancy was identified and corrected and the overall health of the program.

4.7.2.5. Logistics Movement.

4.7.2.5.1. PNAF. Evaluate all units having responsibility for logistic movement of nuclear weapons in accordance with AFJI 11-204 and AFI 11-299. Logistics airlift units must demonstrate the ability to safely and effectively onload, transfer custody, transport, and offload weapons, and shall also be required to demonstrate proficiency in the following areas as it pertains to logistic movement. The use of an actual or training PNAF mission, when available, is recommended.

4.7.2.5.1.1. Aircrew Certification program:

4.7.2.5.1.1.1. Unit commanders maintain enough PNAF-qualified aircrews to support current and projected nuclear airlift requirements.

4.7.2.5.1.1.2. PNAF aircrews are current and qualified.

4.7.2.5.1.1.3. Missions are distributed to maintain aircrew proficiency and experience level.

4.7.2.5.1.1.4. Unit has an active qualification and training program for PNAF aircrews and plans for attrition.

4.7.2.5.1.1.5. PNAF personnel are certified in accordance with AFI 36-2104.

4.7.2.5.1.1.6. PNAF aircrews have required final security clearances.

4.7.2.5.1.2. Operations Effectiveness. Evaluate the following:

4.7.2.5.1.2.1. Aircrew Training and Qualification. PNAF aircrews receive qualification and continuation training in accordance with AMCR 50-16 (to be replaced by AFI 11-237), *Nuclear Weapons Airlift Training*, AFI 91-101, and AFI 11-2C-xxx, Vol. 1, *C-XXX Aircrew Training*. Aircrew members who carry side arms are trained in accordance with AFI 36-2226, *Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM) Program*.

4.7.2.5.1.2.2. Aircraft commanders, courier officers, and loadmasters are evaluated at least once every 17 months.

4.7.2.5.1.2.3. Nuclear information in the flight crew information file (FCIF) is maintained in accordance with AFI 11-401/AMC1.

4.7.2.5.1.3. Mission Planning:

4.7.2.5.1.3.1. Each mission is planned and coordinated with the users in accordance with AFI 11-299.

4.7.2.5.1.3.2. Hot remain over nights (RON) are properly coordinated with host base and documented.

4.7.2.5.1.3.3. Mission planner's coordinate itineraries, security requirements, and cargo loading methods with the operating squadron and users prior to publishing mission setup messages.

4.7.2.5.1.3.4. Mission setup messages have accurate information and are published with sufficient lead-time so the user can respond prior to the mission.

4.7.2.5.1.3.5. Nuclear mission kits are prepared and maintained in accordance with AFI 11-299.

4.7.2.5.1.3.6. The primary mission loadmaster is designated on the AMC Form 41, **Flight Authorization.** The courier and primary mission loadmaster will be designated on the EAL.

4.7.2.5.1.3.7. Aircraft commander, courier, and primary mission loadmaster perform satisfactory pre-briefing mission planning.

4.7.2.5.1.3.8. Intelligence support is provided in accordance with AFI 11-299.

4.7.2.5.1.4. Briefings:

4.7.2.5.1.4.1. Briefing room is secure. Everyone has the proper security clearance.

4.7.2.5.1.4.2. Briefing covers AFI 11-299.

4.7.2.5.1.4.3. Required aircrew members are briefed on or review the applicable portions of the Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG).

4.7.2.5.1.5. Mission Execution:

4.7.2.5.1.5.1. The courier receives the shipper's briefing in accordance with T.O. 11N-45-51C. If the aircraft commander and primary mission loadmaster were not present for the shipper and courier briefing, the courier will brief them on hazards or nature and special-handling instructions before loading.

4.7.2.5.1.5.2. The courier accepts or transfers custody of the cargo in accordance with T.O. 11N-45-51C and AFI 11-299.

4.7.2.5.1.5.3. The aircrew controls access to the no-lone zones and maintain the two-person concept as required by AFI 11-299.

4.7.2.5.1.5.4. Nuclear weapons are onloaded, offloaded, and secured in accordance with appropriate dash-16 procedures.

4.7.2.5.1.5.5. The flight plan is completed properly. Overflight restrictions are considered during flight planning. Proposed departure times are based on the most current en route times and are adjusted, if necessary, to preclude early arrivals.

4.7.2.5.1.5.6. Accomplish AF Form 4086, **C-141 Nuclear Floor Plan Worksheet** or AF Form 4114, **C-17 Nuclear Floor Plan Worksheet** and DD Form 365-4, **Weight and Balance Clearance Form F-Transport,** correctly.

4.7.2.5.1.5.7. Hazardous cargo notification is made to appropriate agencies in accordance with AFJI 11-204.

4.7.2.5.1.6. Home station pre-departure requirements:

4.7.2.5.1.6.1. Aircraft selection is monitored to provide the best available aircraft for nuclear missions. Aircraft certification records, status of aircraft and procedures used for aircraft certification.

4.7.2.5.1.6.2. Senior maintenance representatives personally inspect aircraft selected for nuclear missions to ensure cleanliness, proper configuration, and operationally ready condition.

4.7.2.5.1.6.3. Aircraft are prepared and certified mission ready in accordance with AFI 11-299. Appropriate entries are made in the AFTO Form 781A, **Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document,** in accordance with AFI 11-299.

4.7.2.5.1.6.4. Life support, fleet service, and aerial port will equip aircraft in accordance with wing fragmentary order and AFI 11-299.

4.7.2.5.1.6.5. Aircraft winch is preflight/inspected in accordance with specific technical orders and the aircraft dash-16.

4.7.2.5.2. PNAF Support. Evaluate PNAF support plans, security support, and logistics movement support in accordance with AFJI 11-204 and AFI 11-299. The PNAF support plans evaluation will include air traffic control procedures, ground control-handling procedures, ground servicing, maintenance, and aircrew transportation, billeting, and messing. The security support evaluation will include restricted area and convoy procedures.

4.7.2.5.2.1. Intelligence. Evaluate the intelligence support in accordance with AFI 11-299.

4.7.2.5.2.2. Public Affairs. Possess required checklists, response kits, and procedures for setting up and operating an information center.

4.7.2.5.2.3. Fire Protection.

4.7.2.5.2.3.1. T.O. 11N-20-11 is current, maintained properly, and available to firefighters.

4.7.2.5.2.3.2. Firefighter training for techniques involving conventional and nuclear weapons are current, conducted properly, and documented in accordance with AFI 32-2001.

4.7.2.5.2.3.3. Pre-fire plans for nuclear-laden aircraft are adequately maintained and available in accordance with AFI 10-2501 Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR).

4.7.2.5.2.3.4. Sufficient fire-fighting vehicles and communication equipment are in service, and firefighters available, to adequately respond to emergencies involving nuclear-laden aircraft.

4.7.2.5.2.3.5. The unit maintains adequate procedures to respond to accidents and incidents involving nuclear weapons in order to minimize and recover from damage to facilities, utilities, and the affected environment.

4.7.2.5.2.4. Base Disaster Response Force (DRF).

4.7.2.5.2.4.1. Organized and trained in accordance with AFI 10-2501.

4.7.2.5.2.4.2. FSTR Plan 25-1 and DRF agency checklists outline specific nuclear weapons accident response procedures in accordance with AFI 10-2501 and DoD 3150.8-M. When the base is nearest the scene of a nuclear weapons accident, the DRF becomes the Initial Response Element (IRE). The IRE takes immediate action to provide initial command and control, save lives, and to suppress and control hazards.

4.7.2.5.2.4.3. Response capabilities of DRF agencies will be evaluated annually in a local nuclear weapons accident response exercise in accordance with AFI 10-2501.

4.7.2.5.2.4.4. Disaster Response personnel will maintain tools, test, and handling equipment in accordance with publications governing condition, nuclear certification, calibration, load test, etc.

4.7.2.5.2.5. Base commanders have a written plan in accordance with AFJI 11-204 and AFI 11-299 to support aircraft loaded with nuclear weapons.

4.7.2.5.2.6. AMC Nuclear Capable Units will have a formal nuclear surety plan in accordance with AFI 91-101.

4.7.2.5.3. Tools, Test, Tiedown, and Handling Equipment.

4.7.2.5.3.1. Tiedown Equipment.

4.7.2.5.3.1.1. Status, accountability and condition of support equipment and supplies.

4.7.2.5.3.1.2. Quality and timeliness of maintenance, inspection calibration, and required documentation.

4.7.2.5.3.2. Nuclear Certified Material Handling Equipment and Vehicles.

4.7.2.5.3.2.1. Inspect the nuclear certification of vehicles/equipment and modifications.

4.7.2.5.3.2.2. Status, accountability, and condition of vehicles and equipment.

4.7.2.5.3.2.3. Quality and timeliness of maintenance, inspection calibration, and required documentation.

4.7.2.5.3.3. Shoring. Status, accountability, and condition of nuclear-shoring equipment and material are maintained and provided as required by aerial port.

4.7.2.5.4. Condition of Facilities. Evaluate the condition of surfaces supporting the takeoff/landing, taxiing, and parking of nuclear-laden aircraft.

4.7.2.5.5. Command and Control (C2). Evaluate the following:

4.7.2.5.5.1. C2 operating instructions or Controller Quick Reaction Checklist (QRC) procedures as appropriate IAW AMCI 10-202, Volume 2, *AMC Command and Control (C2) Responsibilities and Procedures*.

4.7.2.5.5.2. Controllers coordinate and document required actions in accordance with AMC, Air Force, and JCS directives. Operational Reporting also include Special Category Mission Reporting.

4.7.2.5.5.3. C2 facility possesses base regulations/plans to launch/recover PNAF aircraft or support nuclear-laden aircraft en route.

4.7.2.5.5.4. Controllers are trained and knowledgeable in nuclear airlift support procedures.

4.7.2.5.5.5. TACC provides aircrews with current computer flight plans, which are planned in accordance with the special weapons overflight guide (SWOG).

4.8. Ratings. The 5-level rating system in AFI 90-201 (Outstanding, Excellent, Satisfactory, Marginal, and Unsatisfactory) will be used for NSIs and LNSIs to assign grades to each Major Graded Area. However, the overall rating will be Satisfactory, Satisfactory (Support Unsatisfactory) (for deficiencies attributed to outside agencies or higher headquarters), or Unsatisfactory. INSIs will be rated "Ready" or "Not Ready."

4.8.1. The overall inspection rating will be determined by applying a combination of team chief and inspector judgment, and the pass or fail criteria. If a deficiency is clearly a failure to meet pass or fail criteria, then the overall rating must be Unsatisfactory. Otherwise, weigh all deficiencies for their impact on the overall rating. Inspector judgment is the key to assigning a proper rating to each area and to the overall inspection.

4.8.2. Required Ratings:

4.8.2.1. The overall inspection.

4.8.2.2. Each evaluated area as specified in paragraph **4.7.2.**

4.8.2.3. Phased NSIs at the completion of all phases.

4.8.2.4. Phased INSIs at the completion of each phase.

4.9. Re-inspection of Deficient Area(s).

4.9.1. HQ AMC/IG will determine the re-inspection policy for AMC.

4.9.2. If the Unsatisfactory rating did not result from an aircrew deficiency, PNAF aircrews will not be prohibited from performing nuclear airlift (does not apply to INSIs). Their mission will not transit the unsatisfactorily rated station with nuclear cargo or nuclear mission requirements (i.e., Type II security, crew change, or RON) until that unit has been re-inspected in deficient areas and receives a Satisfactory rating.

4.9.2.1. The wing agency or an aircrew receiving an Unsatisfactory rating will be prohibited from performing duties involving nuclear weapons until re-inspected using training units per AFI 11-299, Table 2.2. Re-inspection may be limited to areas, which were rated Unsatisfactory, and may be satisfied by an LNSI.

4.9.2.2. In special situations, the inspection team chief may elect to re-inspect immediately. Team chiefs should not conduct an on-the-spot re-inspection if the observation reflected a lack of proficiency or unfamiliarity with procedures. Give considerable attention to the impact on nuclear surety before allowing a unit to continue nuclear weapons operations for the purpose of re-inspection.

4.9.3. For INSIs rated "Not Ready," re-inspect the unit within 90 days. The unit is not nuclear airlift capable until a rating of "Ready" is awarded. Conduct re-inspection as specified by this instruction. Re-inspection may be limited to those areas that were “Not Ready.”

4.9.4. Unless re-inspected immediately, re-inspection of units rated Unsatisfactory will be accomplished by observing a minimum of two simulated nuclear missions. Use of WR weapons for these operations is prohibited. If re-inspected immediately, an LNSI will also be accomplished within 90 days on a prior-notice basis.

4.9.5. Unsatisfactory areas and aircrew performance during an LNSI may not affect a unit's posture; however, AMC/CC may direct a complete NSI as a follow-on action.

4.10. Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection (DNSI) and Surveillance Inspection (SI) Reports.

4.10.1. DNSIs are conducted on a unit once every 4-5 years by Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). DNSIs are performed in accordance with T.O. 11N-25-1 to assure compliance with requirements specified in DoD and joint publications, and applicable portions of Air Force publications that directly implement DoD and joint requirements.

4.10.2. AMC will coordinate with DTRA to conduct inspections concurrently when possible.

4.10.3. Units coordinate replies to DNSI and SI reports through the appropriate MAJCOM functional manager to arrive at HQ AFSC/SEW at least 30 days before the due date to DTRA/AO (as shown on the formal DTRA report). Take corrective action based on the field report provided by the DTRA team at the time of the DNSI or SI.

4.10.4. In the event of an overall Unsatisfactory DNSI rating, HQ AMC must review the results and the unit's status to determine if the procedures of paragraphs **4.5.5.** and **4.5.6.** should be invoked. HQ AFSC/SEW must be notified by message of the results of the evaluation within 48 hours after the DTRA inspection.

4.11. NSI, LNSI, INSCIs and INSI Reports. Provide the results of surety inspections in message and formal report formats. All reports must contain a paragraph reference from the applicable DoD or Air Force publication or technical order for cited deficiencies.

4.11.1. Message Reports. Results of NSIs, LNSIs, INSCIs and INSIs are reported in the format in AFI 90-201, Attachments 2 and 3, as applicable. NSI, LNSI, and INSI message reports may not be combined with other inspection message reports. Use priority precedence when reporting an "Unsatisfactory" or "Not Ready" rating. Even during MINIMIZE, an inspection message is transmitted if the unit is found "Not Ready," "Unsatisfactory," or has LIMFACs and critical or major deficiencies. The message report must contain a description of the LIMFACs and critical and major deficiencies and describe, in detail, the corrective actions taken by the unit. If deficiencies are corrected before completion of the inspection, processing according to paragraph.

4.11.2. Extract Report. (See sample format in AFI 90-201, Attachment 3.) The inspecting team extracts LIMFACs that are the responsibility of a support activity outside AMC channels. This information is put in an extract report, which is sent as follows:

4.11.2.1. An action copy to the responsible MAJCOM IG and applicable staff agency.

4.11.2.2. Information copies to the responsible organization, their intermediate headquarters, and to addressees of the basic report.

4.11.3. Processing NSI Electronic Reports Containing LIMFACs, Critical, or Major Deficiencies.

4.11.3.1. The inspected unit must reply with Corrective Action Plan to the intermediate command by electronic message within 5 workdays after the electronic report is received.

4.11.3.2. Each intermediate command must reply to the next higher command within 5 workdays after receiving the inspected unit's corrective action report.

4.11.4. HQ AMC:

4.11.4.1. Endorses corrective actions within 10 workdays after receiving the intermediate command's report.

4.11.4.2. Sends a follow-up report to HQ AFSC/SEW, 9700 Avenue G, SE, Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5000, every 30-calendar days until a final report is submitted.

4.11.5. Processing an Extract Report. AMC Headquarters:

4.11.5.1. Replies within 30 calendar days after receiving an extract NSI, LNSI, or INSI report that identifies LIMFACs and critical or major deficiencies.

4.11.5.2. Send a follow-up report each 30-calendar day until LIMFACs, critical or major deficiencies have been corrected and the extract report has been closed out.

4.11.5.3. Sends the reply and follow-up reports to the originator and addressees of the extract report.

4.11.6. Formal NSI and INSCI Reports. The AMC inspection team:

4.11.6.1. Gives enough information to the unit commander to allow corrective action to be taken if the formal inspection report will be prepared after the inspection team's departure from the unit.

4.11.6.2. Prepares the formal NSI report according to AMC directives. Copies of this report are sent to HQ AFSC/SEW, 9700 Avenue G, SE, Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5000; SAF/IGI, Washington DC 20330-1000; and to other addressees specified by the MAJCOM.

4.11.6.3. Prepares the formal INSCI report according to AMC directives. Copies of this report are sent to HQ AMC/CEX and the unit support group.

Chapter 5

EN ROUTE READINESS INSPECTIONS (ERI)

5.1. General. En route squadrons are an important element in the air mobility system. Therefore, unit personnel must be fully trained, equipped, and prepared to meet the ever-changing demands of this mission. The guidance in this chapter, along with Chapter 4 of AMCPAM 90-202, will be used to assess a unit's ability to perform their en route support mission.

5.2. Purpose. An ERI will evaluate a unit's ability to move passengers and cargo effectively and expeditiously through the Defense Transportation System (DTS). Emphasis will be on five major graded areas: Deployment Actions, ATSO, Aerial Port, Logistics and Command and Control.

5.2.1. Deployment Actions**.** This major graded area evaluates the unit's ability to ensure personnel and cargo are prepared to meet deployment requirements and to effectively transition from peacetime to contingency/wartime operations. Inspectors will evaluate decision-making, direction, coordination, and reporting between unit command functions, subordinate work centers, and higher headquarters. To perform well, leadership must ensure unit deployment requirements and execution procedures are included in the installation deployment plan. The unit must protect classified information, sensitive operational capabilities, and plans. Additionally, unit personnel should demonstrate sound Defensive Counterinformation (DCI) and integrate threat analysis into daily operations. Sub-areas evaluated include the Unit Deployment Control Center, Mobility Bag/Weapons Management, and Host Base Support.

5.2.2. ATSO. The AMC/IG may inspect ATSO according to criteria established in Para **2.1.3.2.** provided units are in or deployable to a medium and/or high threat area IAW AFI 32-4001, Table 6.3 (Note 3)

5.2.3. Aerial Port. This major graded area evaluates the unit's operation of air terminal facilities in support of DoD-owned and sponsored aircraft, cargo, and passengers. Cargo processing and ramp-service operations will be evaluated to ensure the proper preparation and timely loading of cargo. Special-handling procedures must be conducted by qualified personnel with the training and knowledge to perform hazardous material inspections, receipt and release of shipments, and explosive-handling operations. Fleet services must ensure sanitation practices are followed and coordinate delivery of all flight meals. Passenger service personnel will be evaluated to ensure timely information is disseminated and proper processing procedures are followed. Passenger loading/unloading operations must be completed in a professional and timely manner. The unit's Phase II program and Quality Assurance Evaluation program will be evaluated. Finally, force protection throughout the aerial port, to include single point of entry and Quick Response Checklists, will be evaluated. Sub-areas evaluated include aircraft services, passenger services, and safety.

5.2.4. Logistics. The unit must provide aircraft maintenance, supply, and support to all AMC en route aircraft ensuring safe and effective mission accomplishment. Accurate and timely information flow between flightline maintenance personnel and controlling agencies as well as aircrew debriefing will be evaluated. Forms documentation must accurately reflect current aircraft and equipment status. The unit's management of the consolidated tool kit program, foreign object damage prevention program, and dropped object prevention program will be assessed. Inspectors will validate a sound forward supply location (FSL) asset management program including proper accountability, recording, processing

of FS transactions, and asset serviceability. All hazardous materials should be properly inventoried, stored, and labeled. Sub-areas evaluated include aircraft maintenance management, aircraft maintenance operations, FSL, plans and programs, and safety.

5.2.5. Command and Control (C2). The unit's C2 function is responsible for effective decision-making, direction, coordination, execution, and reporting of deployment and readiness activities. Leadership must ensure timely cross-functional coordination and interaction between the Air Mobility Control Center (AMCC), subordinate work centers, host base, and higher headquarters. Receipt and understanding of deployment tasking messages are critical as well as timely information dissemination to unit leadership. Air Terminal Operations Center (ATOC) personnel must maintain command and control of all aerial port functions, effectively coordinating day-to-day and contingency/mobility operations. Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) personnel must provide positive direction and coordination to all functional areas. The inspection will validate whether OPSEC/COMSEC procedures are strictly practiced and enforced. Sub-areas evaluated include the AMCC/UCC, ATOC, and MOC.

5.3. Frequency. The HQ AMC/IG will schedule ERIs on a 3-year cycle for all en route stations. ERIs may be accomplished in conjunction with another MAJCOM (USAFE or PACAF) Readiness Inspection, real-world contingencies, a major CJCS exercise, or as a stand-alone inspection. Flexible scheduling is key, seizing scheduling opportunities where and when available. Schedulers will keep units informed to the best of their ability.

5.4. Grading. An ERI is results oriented. Grading is based on the overall performance of the unit during mission support activities. Emphasis will be on teamwork, adherence to local and higher headquarters directives, cross-functional support, and safety. The unit will receive a 5-tier rating for overall grade and in each major graded area as follows: Outstanding, Excellent, Satisfactory, Marginal, or Unsatisfactory. Units that receive a "Marginal" or "Unsatisfactory" grade may be re-inspected at the discretion of the AMC/CC, AMC/CV, or NAF/CC.

5.4.1. Corrective Actions process will be IAW para **2.4.3.**

Chapter 6

UNIT COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS (UCI)

6.1. General. UCIs are conducted to assess areas mandated by law as well as mission areas identified by senior Air Force and MAJCOM leadership as critical or important to assess/assure the health and performance of organizations. Unit failure to comply with the established directives in these areas could result in significant legal liabilities, penalties, or significant mission impact.

6.2. Purpose. Common Core Compliance Areas (CCCA). During Unit Compliance Inspections, HQ AMC/IG will evaluate CCCAs (see **Attachment 3**). AFRC units will receive compliance inspections from AFRC/IG using AFRC criteria. CCCAs are areas under the UCI program that mandate inspections based on by-law requirements, executive orders, DOD directives, and Air Force, MAJCOM, and applicable ANG instructions.

6.2.1. HQ AMC/IG will conduct and evaluate a Weapons of Mass Destruction Response Exercise (WMDRE) at AMC active duty wings. The IG will evaluate the installation's crisis response and consequence management capabilities for attacks involving chemical, biological radiological and improvised explosive devices (IED).

6.3. Frequency. UCIs will be conducted every 3 years for active duty and 5 years for AMC-gained ANG units. Inspection frequencies may only be exceeded with MAJCOM commander or designated representative approval.

6.4. Grading. UCI ratings will be based on the traditional five-tier grade scale with five-tier grades given for each sub-area, mission area, and overall wing grade. To improve unit feedback, each checklist item will be graded with a 3-tier grade scale; In Compliance, In Compliance with Comments, and Not in Compliance.

6.5. Scheduling. HQ AMC/IG may attempt to conduct UCIs consecutively with other inspections (SIOP Inspections, EORI, or NSI). If it is not possible to schedule inspections consecutively, UCIs will be completed as stand-alone inspections. Units should expect the IG to inspect all mandated CCCAs within a 3-5 day window.

6.5.1. To aid HQ AMC/IGP in scheduling, commanders will review their units' upcoming deployments and planned exercise schedule and identify inspection opportunities to IG schedulers. The IG will use this information to schedule UCIs with at least 12 months advance notice. Units should stay engaged with the IG, and if additional opportunities present themselves, the IG will attempt to work last-minute requests when practical.

6.6. Responsibilities.

6.6.1. HQ AMC/IG will:

6.6.1.1. Maintain UCI checklists developed by HQ AMC.

6.6.1.2. Coordinate HQ AMC changes to AMCI 90-201 and/or AFI 90-201.

6.6.1.3. Forward any newly proposed AMC CCCAs to AMC/CV for approval prior to incorporation into AMCI 90-201. HQ AMC/IG will forward proposed CCCAs with applicability across the Air Force to SAF/IG for possible incorporation into AFI 90-201.

6.6.1.4. Conduct inspections on all established CCCA items unless responsibility for inspections has been coordinated with another agency.

6.6.1.5. Update HQ AMC/IG web site with current UCI checklists and guidance.

6.6.2. NAF/HQ AMC (Staff Directories) will:

6.6.2.1. Submit proposed CCCA changes. AMC directors and chiefs of special staff agencies notify HQ AMC/IG in writing of specific requirements for AMC CCCA sub-areas. Requests will contain the title, purpose, scope, background, actions required, inspection checklist, units or functions of applicability (active, ANG), project officer or OPR, to include rank, office symbol, and DSN contact number.

6.6.2.2. Develop checklists for identified CCCAs once they have been appointed as OPR. (NOTE: Prior to checklist development SAF/IG must approve AF-wide CCCAs/sub-areas for inclusion in AFI 90-201; or, if mobility-centric, the CCCA/sub-area must be approved by AMC/IG and AMC/CV for inclusion in AMCI 90-201.)

6.6.2.3. Augment HQ AMC/IG to accomplish compliance inspections when necessary.

6.6.3. Inspected units will:

6.6.3.1. Have required program material and/or personnel available during the inspection period.

6.6.3.2. Complete UCI checklists prior to IG team arrival. Copies of current UCI checklists and other information are available from the HQ AMC/IG web site (**https://amc.af.mil/ig/html/inspect3.htm**).

6.7. Corrective Actions. Units that receive a Marginal or Unsatisfactory grade for any of the by-law areas, mission areas, or sub-areas must take immediate action to correct discrepancies. The inspected unit commander must submit a corrective action plan to the NAF commander (active duty), applicable HQ AMC staff agency, and HQ AMC/IG, identifying corrective action taken or the action plan devised to correct the problem. ANG units will also send their corrective action plans to the NGB functional OPR and NGB/IG. Units will continue monthly reporting until the corrective action is deemed sufficient.

6.7.1. HQ AMC/IGCY will officially notify inspected units of the suspense for submitting corrective action plans. The time allowed will normally be 10 working days after the IG approves the inspection report.

6.7.2. Re-inspection. CCCAs or sub-areas that receive a Marginal or Unsatisfactory grade may be re-inspected at the direction of the AMC/CC, AMC/CV, NAF/CC (active units), or NGB/IG (for ANG units). HQ AMC/IG will notify the unit of re-inspection requirements. Grades in the IG database will not be changed, allowing the IG to trend problem areas.

6.7.3. Assessment Database. The IG displays assessment results in a database with drill-down capability for comments. AMC personnel can view the database over the Internet from any location with an ".af.mil" address; procedures for viewing the database are posted on the IG web site.

Chapter 7

INSPECTION OF CONTRACTED ACTIVITIES

7.1. Objective.

7.1.1. The Inspection of Contracted Activities (ICA) provides commanders an independent assessment of operations and maintenance (O&M) funded contracted services. HQ AMC/IG may inspect contracted functions during any inspection venue where contractors are present. This chapter outlines the process for inspecting contracted activities.

7.2. Description.

7.2.1. ICAs assess the contractors' compliance with the Performance Work Statements (PWS) or Statements of Work (SOW) and the adequacy of the PWS or SOW to satisfy mission requirements. Contracts selected for inspection will typically involve mission essential services, high-dollar contracts, highly technical contracts, or contracts with a potential for fraud.

7.2.2. Contractor Relations:

7.2.2.1. The IG will develop and implement safeguards to prevent unnecessary contractor claims resulting from contracted activities inspections.

7.2.2.2. Only the contracting officer can take formal action against the contractor for noncompliance, or direct contractors to correct deficiencies identified during ICAs.

7.2.2.3. IG inspectors will not direct contractor performance, nor will they direct the contractor to correct deficiencies.

7.2.2.4. Determining the adequacy of contractor corrective actions is a local matter in which commanders, Functional Area Chiefs (FACs), Quality Assurance Evaluators (QAEs), and Quality Assurance Representatives (QARs) will work through the contracting officer to resolve.

7.2.2.5. HQ AMC staff agencies may review contractor corrective actions; however, they will not direct or initiate contractor corrective actions.

7.3. Applicability.

7.3.1. The HQ AMC/IG may inspect any service contract written by an AMC contracting activity.

7.3.2. If a non-AMC contracting activity is responsible for the PWS or SOW, an ICA may be conducted in coordination with the non-AMC contracting officer. Applicable FAC or QAR should coordinate with the non-AMC contracting office before communicating inspection results to the contractor, directing correction, and determining the adequacy of contractor corrective actions.

7.4. Scheduling.

7.4.1. ICAs will normally be conducted in conjunction with EORIs or UCIs. The duration will vary with the number of contracts reviewed, but in general will be no longer than the EORI/UCI.

7.4.2. When units are notified of impending inspections, they will notify the HQ AMC/IGP planner of any contracted activities that fall within the scope of the inspection.

7.5. Special Logistical and Administrative Support.

7.5.1. For inspections conducted separate from EORIs/UCIs, support requirements will be determined on a case-by-case basis.

7.5.2. The inspected organization will ensure Internet access to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and related publications are available in the IG work area prior to IG team arrival.

7.5.3. Upon receipt of the approved list of contracts to be inspected, send the following items for each contract to the IG electronically or in hardcopy as appropriate:

7.5.3.1. Two copies of the contract cover page and Section B, Schedule of Supplies or Services and Prices.

7.5.3.2. Two copies of the Performance Work Statement/ Statement of Work, including all modifications.

7.5.3.3. Two copies of all Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASP) and contract administration plans.

7.5.3.4. A list of the names and telephone numbers of all QAEs, contracting officers, and local company POCs.

7.5.3.5. Identification as to type of contract. If contract is award fee, provide copies of all past award fee determinations.

7.5.3.6. Location of contractor performance to include identification on a map.

7.5.3.7. Copies of the most recent SAV reports, Defense Contracting Management Command and Defense Contract Audit Agency reports, quality assurance deficiency reports, internal reports, Government Accounting Office and Air Force Audit Agency reports, IG reports, and any other information dealing with any contract management issues as applicable.

7.6. Process.

7.6.1. The IG will coordinate with HQ AMC/LGC and HQ AMC/JA on contractual policies and other matters that will impact ICAs.

7.6.2. When the IG notifies an organization of an upcoming inspection, the IG will request a list of O&M funded service contracts, including manpower support services and advisory and assistance services contracts, with values over $100,000.

7.6.3. The lead planner will review the list and, in coordination with HQ AMC/LGC and other appropriate headquarters staff offices, select candidates for inspection. The following factors will be considered:

7.6.3.1. The types of services inspected during previous inspections.

7.6.3.2. Services that have historically needed more than normal attention while under contract.

7.6.3.3. Specific areas of interest to the commander or functional staff offices.

7.6.3.4. Types and percentage of eligible contracts that have actually been inspected during previous inspections.

7.6.4. After selection of candidates, the lead planner will develop an inspection schedule and submit the candidates and schedule to HQ AMC IG for formal approval.

7.6.5. The lead planner will forward the approved list and schedule to the organization's project officer. The project officer will provide copies to the contracting officer for distribution to the appropriate QAEs, QARs, and contractors to avoid unreasonable interruptions of contractor performance.

7.6.6. For each contract to be inspected, the organization must send the documents listed in Paragraph **7.5.3.** to the ICA team lead.

7.6.7. During the inspection, the QAEs, QARs, or contracting officer will accompany inspectors.

7.6.8. After the inspection, the IG inspectors will validate any findings and conduct the exit briefings.

7.7. Reports.

7.7.1. Inspection results will be documented in the wing EORI/UCI report.

7.7.2. Report Validation:

7.7.2.1. The Contracting Officer, FAC, QAE, or QAR shall participate in the validation process to ensure only deviations from contractual requirements are identified as deficiencies.

7.7.2.2. In case of PWS or SOW interpretation differences, or matters requiring contracting officer involvement, the contracting officer will be consulted. Validation will not be considered complete until the contracting officer's recommendation is obtained on these matters.

7.7.2.3. After identification and initial validation, the QAE or QAR will validate findings and observations with the contractor's project manager. Involvement by the contracting officer is encouraged.

7.7.3. Report Distribution: Limited copies of the report are distributed to the organization's senior leadership. Mark, safeguard, and handle reports as privileged documents with controlled distribution.

7.7.4. Report Release Authority:

7.7.4.1. Only the portion of the report relating to the specific contractor will be released to the contractor. No other portion of the report will be released. Contracting officers may release those portions of the report applying to specific contractors.

7.7.4.2. The contracting officer is responsible for distributing the inspection report to respective contractors and preparing corrective action replies to the report.

7.7.4.3. For non-AMC contracts, the contracting officer will coordinate with the non-AMC contracting office before communicating inspection results to the contractor, directing corrective actions, or determining adequacy of contractor corrective actions.

7.7.4.4. Inspection findings, observations, and reports may be disclosed to the contractor through the contracting officer with the explicit understanding such results must be treated as privileged information.

7.7.4.5. The contractor's portion of the inspection report is releasable to the contractor through the contracting officer. The privileged document statement in AFI 90-201, Paragraph 2.8. must appear on the released information.

7.7.5. Report Responses:

7.7.5.1. Contracting officers must reply to findings as outlined in the appropriate inspection chapter of this regulation. The respective FACs, QAEs, or QARs must coordinate on the contracting officer's reply before it is submitted to HQ AMC/IG.

7.7.5.2. As a minimum, replies will address the following areas:

7.7.5.2.1. Formal government actions taken by the contracting officer in response to contractor deficiencies identified during the inspection.

7.7.5.2.2. Corrective actions taken by contractors which are considered adequate.

7.8. Briefings.

7.8.1. Entrance Briefings: The HQ AMC/IG Contracting Inspector will brief the contracting officer, QAE, QAR, FAC, and the inspected contractors' project managers at the start of the inspection. The briefing will cover the purpose, scope, and conduct of the inspection.

7.8.2. Functional Area Exit Briefings (Optional): As appropriate, a tabletop discussion of significant deficiencies identified during the inspection will be conducted between the inspection team and the QAE, QAR, FAC, and respective local contracting officer.

7.8.3. Contractor Exit Briefings (Optional): An inspection team member will debrief the inspected contractor's project manager. The QAE, QAR, FAC, and respective local contracting officer will attend and participate in this briefing.

7.9. Graded Areas and Criteria.

7.9.1. Graded Areas:

7.9.1.1. Consistent with the contract SOW or PWS, the IG inspectors may inspect all areas of contractor performance and document any observed noncompliance.

7.9.1.2. The QAE Program, including the contracting officer, the QAE, and the FAC are evaluated and rated during inspections.

7.9.2. Criteria:

7.9.3. HQ AMC/IG inspectors will use the contract PWS or the SOW as the inspection guide and evaluation criteria.

7.9.4. Each contracted activity (e.g., Transient Alert, Military Family Housing, or Maintenance) will be rated individually using the five-tier grading criteria.

7.9.5. Ratings less than SATISFACTORY will be coordinated with the appropriate contracting office prior to publication in the report.

Chapter 8

SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM (SII) INSPECTIONS

8.1. General. HQ AMC/IG and other AMC staff agencies inspect SIIs established by HQ AMC, NGB, HQ AFRC, and SAF/IG. The purpose of an SII is to determine the extent and impact of known or suspected problems, identify specific deficiencies, or to confirm that a problem has been resolved. (***NOTE:*** AMC SIIs do not apply to AFRC units unless coordinated through HQ AFRC/IGIO, DSN 497-1504. Normally, AFRC/IG inspects SIIs for AFRC units. HQ AMC/IG will only conduct SII Inspections for AFRC units with HQ AFRC/IG approval, and on a case-by-case basis. USSTRATCOM IG may also inspect USCINCSTRAT SIIs during SIOP inspections. AMC/CC or AMC/DO Special Interest Items relating to ASEVs or Standardization/Evaluation and Training functions will be evaluated by NAF ASEV teams.)

8.2. Inspection Scheduling. The IG may conduct its SII inspections during another inspection (EORI, ERI, NSI, SIOP Inspection, or UCI) or separately.

8.3. Inspection Procedures. Each SII has a designated AMC staff agency appointed as OPR. Units will complete SII checklists prior to IG team arrival; the IG will validate results during the inspection. Copies of current SII checklists and other information are available from the AMC/IG homepage (**https://.amc.af.mil/ig/html/index.htm**). Select "Inspections" from the menu on the left side of the page, then "SII."

8.4. Grades. The IG assigns grades for each SII. The overall grade for each SII will be: "Satisfactory" or "Unsatisfactory." SII sub-areas may be graded "Satisfactory," "Unsatisfactory," or "Satisfactory with comments" that require action or attention.

8.5. Corrective Actions. Units that receive an Unsatisfactory grade for any SII must immediately correct the discrepancy, and the unit commander must submit a corrective action plan to the NAF commander (for active duty and AFRC units), appropriate HQ AMC staff agency, and a courtesy copy to HQ AMC/IG, describing the corrective actions taken/being taken. ANG will also send corrective actions to the appropriate NGB-functional OPR and to NGB/IG. HQ AMC/IGCY will officially notify inspected units of their suspense for a corrective action plan. The suspense will normally be within 10 working days of the date the report is posted on the IG web site.

8.6. Re-inspection. After reviewing the corrective action plan and actions taken, the HQ AMC staff agency will recommend to the NAF/CC the need for any re-inspection; the NAF/CC will decide if the recommended re-inspection is required. The HQ AMC staff agency will coordinate with the IG on who will conduct the re-inspection (staff agency or IG). When the HQ AMC staff agency determines the corrective action is sufficient to clear the discrepancy, they will notify the IG and the IG will update the SII database to reflect action complete.

8.7. SII Update Briefing. During semiannual inspection update briefings, the IG will brief the results of all SII Inspections, including trend information. Additionally, when an AMC SII closes out, the directorate that originally requested the SII will brief its overall findings to the staff.

8.8. Establishing SIIs. AMC directors and chiefs of special staff agencies notify HQ AMC/IG in writing of specific requirements for AMC SIIs. SII requests will contain the title, purpose, scope, background, actions required, inspection checklist, effective period, units or functions of applicability (active, ANG, and AFRC), project officer or OPR, to include rank, office symbol, and DSN contact number. HQ AMC/IG will forward the proposed AMC SIIs to AMC/CV for approval prior to release by the IG.

8.9. Effective SIIs. To be effective, the SII program must meet a rigid set of criteria and be kept to a minimum number to facilitate both the execution and evaluation of SIIs. The AMC staff should use the criteria below for review and development of SIIs:

8.9.1. Does the SII directly impact AMC mission readiness?

8.9.2. Are there any other ways to emphasize a review of the process other than through a SII? For example, could a message, staff assistance visit, or computer programs provide the same information? An SII should be used as a last resort, not to address ancillary administrative matters.

8.9.3. Does the IG have the resources, i.e., manpower and time, to properly validate the SII? HQ AMC/IG functional personnel should determine this when the SII is initially coordinated. AMC staff augmentation to the IG may be required in order to accomplish the actual SII field assessment.

8.10. AMC-gained Units. The HQ AMC OPR must coordinate each SII through HQ AFRC/IGIO or NGB/IGD to determine the applicability to AMC-gained Guard and Reserve forces. Agencies requesting AMC SIIs pertaining to Guard and Reserve units will ensure directives are listed in AFRC and NGB gaining command indexes or announced in AFRC and NGB publications bulletins.

8.11. Effective Period. The period covered by an AMC SII will not exceed 12 months unless approved by HQ AMC/IG. Justification for SIIs longer than 12 months must accompany the SII. OPRs will send extension requests for existing SIIs to HQ AMC/IG a minimum of 30 days prior to the quarter in which the SII expires. AMC functional managers should continually review all SIIs and provide any changes to HQ AMC/IGPS.

8.12. Quarterly SII Listing. During the October, January, April, and July timeframes, HQ AMC/IGPS (SII administrator) releases a quarterly SII listing identifying all applicable SIIs to AIG 9541.

Chapter 9

SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

9.1. General. This chapter contains support requirements for the planning of all inspection team visits.

9.2. Transportation, Lodging, and Baggage Support. (POC: HQ AMC/IGPS, DSN 779-0450/0464).

9.2.1. HQ AMC/IGPS will forward a written request for transportation to TACC/XOB at least 2 weeks in advance of the team movement. TACC/XOB will then task the active duty unit being inspected (or an appropriate alternative) to provide transportation by matching a training sortie with the team's travel requirement. For ANG units, TACC will request transportation through the ANG/DOX. For AFRC units, TACC will request transportation through HQ AFRC/DOOM. The IG will fund individual TDYs and small groups to and from the inspected unit when other means are not available.

9.2.2. The inspection team requires adequate lodging, as defined by current guidance. The "team integrity" requirement has been eliminated for lodging arrangements; therefore, for all visits, on-base government lodging should be used for IG team members to the maximum extent possible. If adequate lodging is not available on base, use whatever government lodging is available and contract or lease lodging off base that meets all requirements. Non-availability should be used as a last resort for IG team lodging. If non-availability or contract lodging is necessary, the unit project officer should contact the IG POC immediately. The IG estimates that 95 percent of their total room requirement should be nonsmoking.

9.2.3. Vehicles should be available upon team arrival.

9.2.4. Bus transportation and baggage support is required to transport the IG team to work centers, if vehicles are not readily available upon arrival, and to transport team members to aircraft upon departure.

9.3. Funding Responsibilities. (POC: HQ AMC/IGPS, DSN 779-0464/0450).

9.3.1. HQ AMC/IG team support:

9.3.1.1. TDY. The IG funds for TDY of its personnel accomplishing AMC oversight visits. It also funds per diem and transportation costs of those personnel from AMC and AMC-gained units who augment the IG as inspectors. The IG does not fund observer personnel to oversight visits.

9.3.1.2. Vehicle Rental. The IG will notify the inspected unit of its home-station IG vehicle requirement. AMC active duty units (host/tenant) are responsible for supporting and funding this requirement out of in-house government assets or commercial rentals. For inspected ANG and AFRC unit-equipped locations and all forward operating base (FOB) locations, the IG will provide both vehicle requirement and fund cite, if necessary, for IG commercial rentals, to the appropriate agency.

9.3.1.3. Lodging. The IG will notify the inspected unit of home-station billeting requirements. Government lodging should be used to the maximum extent possible. If commercial contract lodging is required for a large team, an AF Form 616 or DD Form 448 will be issued. For smaller teams, the inspected unit will obtain a government rate and reserve rooms; in this case, the IG

team members will pay for their rooms using their government credit cards upon arrival. The IG will deal bilaterally with appropriate agencies at FOB locations.

9.3.2. Inspected unit (AMC/AMC-gained) responsibilities:

9.3.2.1. TDY. The inspected unit is responsible for funding per diem and transportation of inspected unit personnel and any manning assistance/augmentation from AMC units or other MAJCOM units. This includes all unit functional areas as well as generic assistance (e.g., TALCE, MST, aerial port, etc.) that a unit might use during their EORI scenario.

9.3.2.2. Vehicles. The inspected unit is responsible for funding (if required) both its home station and deployed location vehicle operations. Maximum use of government vehicles is required.

9.3.2.3. Lodging. The inspected unit is responsible for funding (if required) both its home station and deployed location lodging support. Maximum use of government lodging is required.

9.3.2.4. Miscellaneous. During EORI scenarios at home station/deployed locations, the inspected unit is responsible for all contract commercial and government purchases made by them during the course of the inspection scenario. These costs include, but are not limited to, items such as subsistence, ground fuel, water, ice, portable toilets, trash removal, and dining hall support.

9.4. Home Station Work Area Requirements. (POC: HQ AMC/IGPS, DSN779-0450/0464. All work areas must possess sufficient security protection for high-value items associated with IG team equipment and a minimum of six keys for IG team use.

9.4.1. Team Chief. Designate a private office space located near the IG work area with four additional chairs. Two single-line Class A telephones are required (one for telecommunications via computer).

9.4.2. Work Area. Designate a large facility with tables and chairs for IG team members. As a minimum, four single-line Class A telephones, FAX machine, copier, and shredder are required (or the unit may choose to provide convenient access to a shredder on a 24-hour per day basis so close-hold, IG Trusted Agent, and For Official Use Only information can be disposed of properly). Also required is a sufficient power source (12 three-prong capability surge protectors) and electrical outlets throughout the area, which will allow the team's laptop computers to operate simultaneously.

9.4.3. Administration. Designate an area in or near the IG work area of sufficient size to accommodate two administrative personnel and equipment for report preparation. This room must have three spare 60-inch tables and space for required typing and word processing equipment/tables. Two single-line Class A telephones are required (one for telecommunications via computer).

9.4.4. Crisis Action Team. During the inspection, designate a lighted work area in the CAT room to accommodate two team members.

9.4.5. Maintenance Radio. Provide one portable radio on the maintenance flightline expediter frequency for home station and each FOB to the maintenance inspector.

9.4.6. Cell Phones. Provide two cell phones for team use during each SIOP Inspection.

9.5. Home Station Work Area Supply Requirements. (POC: HQ AMC/IGPS, DSN779-0450/0464).

9.5.1. A copy of your unit alpha roster, key personnel roster, and base telephone book will be forwarded to the IG administrative assistant (AA) (contact HQ AMC/IGPS for AA POC) at least 2 weeks prior to inspection or supplied to the AA upon IG arrival at the unit.

9.5.2. Items listed in **Table 9.1.** are also required:

Table 9.1. Required Supplies.

ITEM	ALL INSPECTIONS
Unit alpha roster	1
Key personnel roster	5
Staff directory	5
Computers*	3
Laser printers	3
Laser printer paper	4 reams
Copier (auto feed, duplex, and collator)	1
Standard copier paper	5 reams
Shredder	1
FAX machine	1
Cell phones	2 (SIOP only)
Surge protectors	12
Wall map of base	1
Typist chairs	3
Admin area work tables (long)	3
Base telephone book	1 (per phone)
Off-base telephone book	1 (per phone)
Floppy diskettes (dual sided, high density, 1.44 MB)	3 boxes
Typist copy aid stands	3
Staplers (w/staples)	6
Staple removers	4
2-hole punch	1
3-hole punch	1
Ruler, 12-inch	1
Writing pads (white-lined)	1 per 2-3 team members
File folders (letter size)	10
Pencils, #2	2 dozen
Ball point pens	2 dozen
Paper clips (small)	1 box
Electric pencil sharpener	1

ITEM	ALL INSPECTIONS
Scotch tape w/holder	4
Waste baskets w/trash bags	10
Scissors	3
Post it notes, 3 x 5	10
Highlighters (blue or yellow)	2 boxes
Small black binder clips	1 box
Medium black binder clips	1 box
Rubber bands	I package
Dictionaries	3
Thesaurus	2
In and out baskets (single)	16
Duct tape	1 roll
20-cup coffee pot and supplies (IG team will reimburse costs of coffee supplies, i.e., cups, sugar, cream, coffee, etc.)	1
* Minimum of Pentium 266 MHz or better w/ CD ROM and 3.5" disk drive. Software requirement: Windows 98, MS Office Suite 97. System furniture: Proper height adjustment tables. ***NOTE:*** For units located at overseas locations, computers require Internet access so team members can access their office E-mail accounts.	

Chapter 10

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS INSPECTIONS

10.1. General.

10.1.1. HQ AMC is subject to various Department of Defense, United States Transportation Command, and other higher headquarters visits that may involve any staff agency. Examples of such visits are AFIA-conducted EAGLE LOOK management reviews or Air Force Audit Agency audits, etc.

10.1.2. Release of information in Inspector General reports is subject to restrictions according to applicable regulations and this instruction.

10.2. Prior-Notice Actions. When notified of a scheduled visit to AMC:

10.2.1. HQ AMC/IGP will notify the AMC Command Section and appropriate staff agencies. AMC Command Section will designate a lead agency in accordance with guidance listed below. Additional visited agencies will respond to the designated agency as required.

10.2.2. The AMC staff agency programmed for a visit will:

10.2.2.1. Appoint a project officer.

10.2.2.2. Notify HQ AMC/IGP of name, rank, and telephone number of AMC project officer.

10.2.2.3. Contact visiting team OPR for pertinent information.

10.2.2.4. Arrange for the team's local lodging and transportation.

10.2.2.5. Make appropriate arrangements for office space and clerical assistance as required.

10.2.2.6. Arrange the visiting team's inbriefing after coordination with the inspection team chief.

10.2.2.7. Notify the AMC Command Section with the requested date and time of the briefing when the presence of AMC/CC is requested at the outbriefing.

10.3. No Prior-Notice Actions. When a higher headquarters inspection team arrives at HQ AMC on a no-prior-notice inspection, the staff agency first receiving the inspection team will:

10.3.1. Notify the AMC gatekeeper (HQ AMC/IGP) of the inspection.

10.3.2. Arrange for a meeting between the inspection team chief and the HQ AMC Inspector General, as required.

10.3.3. Comply with applicable team support requirements found in **Chapter 7**.

10.4. Forms Prescribed. AMC Form 188**, Inspection/Exercise Communication.**

THOMAS E. STICKFORD, Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

DoD Directive 3150.2, *Safety Studies and Reviews of Nuclear Weapons Systems*

DoD Regulation 5200.1-R, *DoD Information Security Program*

DoD Regulation 5400.7-R, *DoD Freedom of Information Act Program*

AFPD 90-2, *Inspector General-The Inspection System*

AFRP 90-1, *TIG Brief*

AFJI 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Material*

AFI 11-299, *Nuclear Airlift Operations*

AFI 11-2Cxxx, *C-XXX Aircrew Training*

AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*

AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Regulations*

AFI 32-3001, *Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program*

AFI 32-4001, *Disaster Preparedness Planning and Operations*

AFI 32-4004, *Emergency Response Operations*

AFI 36-2104, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program*

AFI 36-2105, *Officer Classification*

AFI 36-2226, *Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM) Program*

AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*

AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*

AFI 91-104, *Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs*

AFMAN 91-201, *Explosives Safety Standards*

AFI 91-204, *Safety Investigations and Reports*

AMCI 32-3001, *Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program*

AMC Pamphlet 90-202, *Inspection Checklists*

SD 501-14, *Force Management Information System (FMIS) Reporting Procedures*

TO 11N-25-1, *DoD Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AARP—Alert Aircraft Repositioning Plan

ACM—Additional Crew Member

AEF—Aerospace Expeditionary Force

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFIA—Air Force Inspection Agency

AFWUS—Air Force-Wide UTC Availability/Tasking Summary

AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive

AFRC—Air Force Reserve Command

AFSC—Air Force Specialty Code

AMC—Air Mobility Command

AMCTL—Air Mobility Command Task List

AMOG—Air Mobility Operations Group

AMSG—Air Mobility Support Group

AMS—Air Mobility Squadron

ANG—Air National Guard

APF—Aerial Port Flight

APS—Aerial Port Squadron

ARC—Air Reserve Component

ART—AEF UTC Reporting Tool

ART—Air Reserve Technician

ASEV—Aircrew Standardization Evaluation Visit

ATSO—Ability to Survive and Operate

C3—Command, Control, and Communications

CAT—Crisis Action Team

CCCA—Common Core Compliance Area

CCRC—Common-Core Readiness Criteria

CCP—Command and Control Procedures (Test)

CRAF—Civil Reserve Air Fleet

CRTC—Combat Readiness Training Center

DCC—Deployment Control Center

DCI—Defensive Counterinformation

DNSI—Defense Nuclear Surety Inspections

DOC—Designed Operational Capability

DoD—Department of Defense

DoE—Department of Energy

DPU—Deployment Processing Unit

DRF—Disaster Response Force

DRU—Direct Reporting Unit

DTRA—Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EAF—Expeditionary Aerospace Force

EAL—Entry Authority List

EOD—Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EORI—Expeditionary Operational Readiness Inspection

ERI—En route Readiness Inspection

FAA—Federal Aviation Administration

FCIF—Flight Crew Information File

FMC—Fully Mission Capable

FOB—Forward Operating Base

FOUO—For Official Use Only

FPCON—Force Protection Condition

FSTR—Full Spectrum Threat Response

GOC—Group Operations Center

GKT—General Knowledge Test

GRL—Global Reach Laydown

IG—Inspector General

IGPRS—Inspector General Performance Reporting System

IGX—Inspector General-Generated Exercise

INSI—Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection

IO—Intelligence Oversight

IR—Initial Response

JA/ATT—Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training

LERTCON—Alert Condition

LIMFAC—Limiting Factor

LNSI—Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection

MAJCOM—Major Command

MARE—Major Accident Response Exercise

MDS—Mission, Design and Series

MEGP—Mission Essential Ground Personnel

MET—Mission Essential Task

METL—Mission Essential Task List

MMI—Multi-MAJCOM Inspection

MOC—Maintenance Operations Center

NAS—Nuclear Airlift Support

NGB—National Guard Bureau

NMC—Not Mission Capable

NSI—Nuclear Surety Inspection

NSM—Nuclear Surety Manager

OPLAN—Operation Plan

OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility

OPSEC—Operations Security

ORI—Operational Readiness Inspection

OSA—Operational Support Aircraft

PAA—Primary Aircraft Authorization

PNAF—Prime Nuclear Airlift Force

Prime BEEF—Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force

Prime RIBS—Prime Readiness in Base Services

PRP—Personnel Reliability Program

QRC—Quick Reaction Checklist

RAT—Readiness Assessment Team

RF—Response Force

SAF—Secretary of the Air Force

SART—Strategic Aircraft Regeneration Teams

SII—Special Interest Item

SIOP—Single Integrated Operational Plan

SOLL —Special Operations Low-Level

SORTS—Status of Resources and Training System

SRC—Survival Recovery Center

SWOG—Special Weapons Overflight Guide

TACC—Tanker Airlift Control Center

TALCE—Tanker Airlift Control Element

TRT—Tanker Recovery Team

UCI—Unit Compliance Inspection

UTA—Unit Training Assembly

UTC—Unit Type Code

USP&FO—United States Property and Fiscal Office

WMD—Weapons of Mass Destruction

WMP—War Mobilization Plan

WOC—Wing Operations Center

WR—War Reserve

Terms

Ability To Survive and Operate (ATSO)—A major graded area during exercises and inspections for operational readiness that describes a unit's ability to protect, sustain, or restore an installation's mission capability. Criteria for ATSO includes: command and control, contingency operations before, during and after a contingency, plans for hardening, detection and warning procedures, reconnaissance team readiness, contamination avoidance procedures, and damage repair, fire protection, and individual protective actions.

Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF)—An organization comprised of aerospace capabilities that provides tailored force packages to meet theater CINC needs across the full spectrum of military operations. Capable of performing any number of the Air Force's basic functions to include a full complement of Expeditionary Combat Support forces. (EAF PAD)

Aerospace Expeditionary Force UTC Reporting Tool (ART)—ART is a web-based, non-intrusive, html-environment tool with associated databases to support collection, collation, and report generation of unit and aggregate UTC readiness data. It resides on the SIPRNET (**http://aefcenter.langley.af.smil.mil <http://aefcenter@langley.af.smil.mil>**) for secure access. Units that are allocated UTC taskings under AEF, view and report their status against these taskings directly on the ART website.

Air Force-Wide UTC Availability/Tracking Summary (AFWUS)—A database that contains a list of all Air Force UTCs. Used by HQ AMC to source OPLAN and contingency TPFDDs. Units are tasked to maintain capability defined by AFWUS UTCs.

Air Mobility Operations Group (AMOG)—Provides the organization and management that direct and supervise deployable AMC forces to provide worldwide Global Reach Laydown (GRL) forces in support of USTRANSCOM-assigned missions. It also provides liaison with ANG and AFRC forces, and maintains a trained force of Theater Airlift Liaison Officers (TALO) assigned at major using commands within the parent NAF AOR.

Crisis Action Team (CAT)—Command and staff personnel assembled in accordance with AMCI 10-208, Volume 1 to respond to contingency or emergency situations. Battle staff is a synonymous term.

Common Core Compliance Areas (CCCA)—Areas under the Compliance Inspection program that mandate inspection(s) based on by-law requirements, executive orders, DoD directives, and Air Force, MAJCOM, and applicable Air National Guard Instructions.

Designed Operational Capability (DOC)—A DOC statement is a summary of a units mission and resources for which it has been organized or designed (or equipped, when tasked). The SORTS DOC Statement is a hard copy management tool used to describe a unit's mission and provides details for its SORTS measurement criteria.

Findings—Significant deficiencies identified during inspection, not otherwise addressed in prescribed Corrective Action Processes. "Findings" will be identified in inspection reports. Units will provide corrective action plans for Findings using procedures outlined in para **2.4.3.**

Force Protection Condition (FPCON)—A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved program standardizing the Military Services' identification of and recommended responses to terrorist threats against US personnel and facilities. The program facilitates inter-Service coordination and support for antiterrorism activities. There are four FPCONs above normal: FPCON ALPHA, FPCON BRAVO, FPCON CHARLIE, and FPCON DELTA.

Forward Operating Base (FOB)—An airfield used to support operations without establishing full support facilities. The base may be used for an extended time period.

Global Reach Laydown (GRL)—A deployable en route support system used where infrastructure is insufficient for AMC operations. Under GRL, resources from various CONUS-based organizations are brought together to form deployed organizations required to achieve specific objectives of any particular air mobility operation (AMC Omnibus OPlan).

Inspector General-Generated Exercise (IGX)—In an IGX, the HQ AMC/IG tasks UTCs from various units to combine into an expeditionary wing for the purpose of an inspection. The goal is a doctrinally sound scenario that emphasizes team building and fosters an expeditionary culture, thus mirroring real-world operations. The notional IGX is a "playbox" lasting approximately 14 days, where total force capability will be "rainbowed" in and out.

Joint MAJCOM NSI—An inspection conducted to evaluate the total nuclear mission at an installation. HQ AMC, Office of the Inspector General, Planning and Scheduling Division (IGP), will coordinate inspection schedules with affected commands annually. HQ AMC/IGP will ensure AMC representation in all affected AMC support areas. AMC need not publish a separate AMC NSI report, but will provide inputs to the operational command's report.

Nuclear Airlift Support (NAS) Base—An AMC base that hosts a nuclear-capable tenant, nuclear storage facility or bases that support nuclear logistics missions, and bases listed in AFI 11-299.

Observation—A management process or procedure, which either fails to meet or exceeds standards. It can also be a unique process or procedure that could benefit units with similar missions. If the HQ AMC staff deems that an observation requires an answer from the inspected unit, the staff will request a response via message to the inspected unit.

Operation Plan (OPLAN)—A plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as the basis for development of an OPORD. An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC's Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations.

Out of Play—Personnel (including on-scene supervisors), aircraft, or ground equipment may be removed

from scenario participation (out of play) by the inspection team for safety violations, improper responses to chemical warfare exercise/simulated threat situations, malfunctioning equipment, or other ineffective responses that pose a serious threat. Units will not use personnel, aircraft, or equipment declared out of play until released by the inspection team.

Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) Wing—An AMC airlift wing with a squadron or squadrons identified to perform programmed logistic airlift of nuclear weapons.

Safety Violations—Unsafe acts or conditions that result in or, in the judgment of an inspector could result in damage to aircraft, equipment, and/or injury to personnel.

Simulate—A direction or approval by the HQ AMC/IG to not perform specific actions. When a unit receives an instruction to simulate, it will take all preparatory steps, such as drafting messages, reviewing checklists/instructions, and reporting simulated completion to the appropriate authority. (Units will maintain supporting directives, messages, records of verbal orders and so forth, for review by the inspectors.)

Sortie—An operational flight by one aircraft. A sortie begins when the aircraft begins to move forward on takeoff or takes off vertically from rest at any point of support. It ends after airborne flight when the aircraft returns to the surface and: (1) the engines are stopped, or the aircraft is on the surface for 5 minutes, whichever occurs first; (2) a change is made in the crew which adds a crewmember. On missions where some crewmembers deplane and the remaining crew from the original takeoff re-launches, this is considered a continuation of the original sortie.

Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)—A JCS controlled, automated data system primarily created to provide to NCA and JCS with authoritative identification, location, and resource information. It is used throughout the chain of command to measure the daily resource status of operating forces.

Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE)—A mobile command and control organization deployed to support strategic and theater air mobility operations at fixed, en route, and deployed locations where air mobility operational support is nonexistent or insufficient. The TALCE provides on-site management of air mobility airfield operations to include command and control, communications, aerial port services, maintenance, security, transportation, weather, intelligence, and other support functions, as necessary. The TALCE is composed of mission support elements from various units and deploys in support of peacetime, contingency, and emergency relief operations on both planned and “no-notice” basis. The TALCE is sized based upon projected requirements (Air Mobility Master Plan).

Trusted Agent—A person or office to whom the IG has given information or with whom the IG has coordinated events, and trusts they will not pass the information to inspected units.

Unit Compliance Inspection (UCI)—AF program to inspect items requiring actions by US laws, executive orders, DoD directives, and safety, that if not complied with could result in significant legal liabilities, penalties, or mission impact. See AMCI 90-201, **Attachment 3** for a list of CCCA items. The HQ AMC IG web site also contains a copy of current CI items and the checklists used to inspect them.

Unit Type Code (UTC)—A five-character alphanumeric designator that identifies a specific capability package. The UTCs for all Air Force packages are found in Volume III of the WMP and are used by unified and specified commands, HQ USAF, and the JCS to identify forces required to support contingency plans.

Weapon System—A composite of equipment, skills, and techniques that form an instrument of combat.

The term includes the aircraft and all of the facilities, equipment, material, services, and personnel required in an operational environment.

Wing Operations Center (WOC)—Provisional (deployed) wing or group commander's battle staff and executive command and control agency. The WOC is an operationally integrated collection of functional work centers which manage unit-assigned, mission-essential forces and resources needed to generate aircraft, aircrew loads, and deployable mission support elements at beddown locations in order to satisfy higher headquarters-directed tasking.

Attachment 2

AMC NSI ELECTRONIC MESSAGE ADDRESSEES

FROM HQ AMC IG TEAM (Base)//(Functional Address Symbol)//

TO HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//DO/CE/LG/FM/IGP/SEW//
HQ AMC TACC SCOTT AFB IL//XOOMS//
(AMC Numbered Air Force) (Base)//CC//
(Inspected Wing) (Base)//CC//
(Inspected Group) (Base)//CC//
(Inspected Squadron) (Base)//CC//

INFO HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//SEI/XOF/XON/ILMW//
HQ AFSC KIRTLAND AFB NM//CC//SEW//
HQ AFIA KIRTLAND AFB NM//CC//
NCCS SUPPORT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//
OSAF WASHINGTON DC//IGI//
HQ AFSPA KIRTLAND AFB NM//SPO//
DTRA KIRTLAND AFB NM//AO/NSSI//

Attachment 3

COMMON CORE COMPLIANCE AREA (CCCA)

A3.1. Common Core Compliance Area Application. The following Air Force-level CCCAs, as supplemented by HQ AMC, represent key processes, procedures, and requirements based on by-law requirements, executive orders, DOD directives, and Air Force, MAJCOM, and applicable Air National Guard Instructions.

A3.1.1. **By-Law Requirements, Executive Orders, DOD Directives.**

A3.1.1.1. Intelligence Oversight.

A3.1.1.2. * Transition Assistance Programs (TAP).

A3.1.1.3. * Voting Assistance Program.

A3.1.1.4. * Sexual Harassment Education and Prevention.

A3.1.1.5. *# Homosexual Conduct Policy.

A3.1.2. **Mission Areas.**

A3.1.2.1. Transportation.

A3.1.2.2. Supply.

A3.1.2.3. Contracting.

A3.1.2.4. Munitions (Non-Nuclear).

A3.1.2.5. Civil Engineer.

A3.1.2.6. Communications and Information.

A3.1.2.7. Disaster Response.

A3.1.2.8. Plans and Programs.

A3.1.2.9. # Safety.

A3.1.2.10. # Occupational Health.

A3.1.2.11. Installation Security.

A3.1.2.12. Services.

A3.1.2.13. Financial Management.

A3.1.2.14. Personnel.

A3.1.2.15. Aircrew Protection.

A3.1.2.16. Self-Inspection Program.

*Not applicable to ANG units.

#Inspected by an AMC staff agency other than the IG.

NOTE: HQ AMC/IG does not conduct UCIs on AFRC units, and some compliance areas do not apply to ANG units. Staff agencies other than the IG will conduct oversight on compliance areas annotated above. AFI 90-201 contains a description of each CCCA. The HQ AMC/IG web site will contain additional information on compliance areas, along with CCCA checklists the AMC/IG will use to inspect them.

NOTE: Each sub-area has a "code" (i.e. **(CTAP1)**) that is used to correlate sub-areas with the inspection report and IGPRS.

A3.2. By-Law Requirements, Executive Orders, DOD Directives.

A3.2.1. **Intelligence Oversight** (Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities;* DOD Directive 5240.1, *DOD Intelligence Activities;* AFPD 14-1, *Intelligence Applications and Requirements Planning;* AFI 14-104*, Oversight of Intelligence Activities*).

A3.2.1.1. **(CIO01)** Assess the intelligence unit's and staff's compliance with the rules and procedures pertaining to collecting, retaining, and disseminating intelligence on US persons (reference the checklist in AFI 14-104).

A3.2.1.2. **(CIO02)** Evaluate whether intelligence units and staffs have an adequate intelligence oversight program (reference AFI 14-104).

A3.2.2. **Transition Assistance Programs** (TAP) (DOD Directive 1332.35, *Transition Assistance for Military Personnel*).

A3.2.2.1. **(CTAP1)** Assess Military Personnel Flight (Personnel Relocations Element) completion of DD Form 2648, Preseparation Counseling Checklist, as a permanent document for the Unit Personnel Record Group (UPRG) of each separating or retiring member 90 days prior to separation (Reference AFI 36-3022, Paragraph 2.7.5).

A3.2.2.2. **(CTAP2)** Ensure members are aware how to access DD Form 2586, Verification of Military Experience and Training (VMET).

A3.2.2.3. **(CTAP2)** Determine if all members retired under the Temporary Early Retirement Act (TERA) are documented as confirmed registrants for Public and Community Service (PACS) prior to outprocessing.

A3.2.2.4. **(CTAP3)** Assess the transition counseling and employment preparation program at military installations with more than 500 members assigned or serving.

A3.2.2.5. **(CTAP4)** Evaluate the allocation/availability of resources necessary to provide quality TAPs.

A3.2.3. **Voting Assistance Program** (DOD Directive 1000.4, *Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)*, National Defense Authorization Act of FY 02 (NDAA FY02), and DEPSECDEF Memo 2 May 2002, *Command Support for the Federal Voting Assistance Progra*m).

A3.2.3.1. **(CVAP1)** Determine if all Voting Assistance Officers are trained and equipped to provide assistance to Armed Forces members.

A3.2.3.2. **(CVAP2)** Determine if commanders ensure timely, in-hand delivery of the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) form for registration/absentee ballot requests to all Armed Forces members and their eligible family members.

A3.2.3.3. **(CVAP3)** Determine if there is one senior Voting Assistance Officer at each installation and at every level of command to coordinate subordinate unit and tenant command Voting Assistance Officer activities.

A3.2.3.4. Determine if Voting Assistance Officers at overseas installations ensure timely dissemination of the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB) to all locations.

A3.2.3.5. Determine if performance evaluation reports for Voting Assistance Officers comment on that individual's performance as a Voting Assistance Officer.

A3.2.3.6. Forward a consolidated report of Voting Assistance Program inspection results to SAF/IGI by the 10th of January each year addressing the DOD-mandated questions below. SAF/IG will submit a report to DOD IG by 31 January.

A3.2.3.6.1. What is your assessment of your MAJCOM's overall compliance with DOD Directive 1000.4, AFI 36-3107, and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act?

A3.2.3.6.2. What was the scope of your Voting Assistance Program inspections?

A3.2.3.6.3. What procedures are used to ensure that all Unit Voting Assistance Officers received adequate training on the Federal Voting Assistance Program?

A3.2.3.6.4. What was the maximum number of voters represented by Unit Voting Assistance Officers in your command?

A3.2.3.6.5. How did you ensure command support, at all levels, for the Federal Voting Assistance Pro-gram?

A3.2.3.6.6. How did your command ensure adequate levels of voting materials were delivered to Unit Voting Assistance Officers?

A3.2.4. **Sexual Harassment Education and Prevention** (*Secretary, Joint Staff Directive on Department of Defense Policy on Sexual Harassment,* 21 Oct 98).

A3.2.4.1. **(CSH01)** Evaluate sexual harassment education and training.

A3.2.4.2. **(CSH02)** Evaluate whether military and civilian leaders are personally involved in training.

A3.2.4.3. **(CSH03)** Assess whether training includes instruction in understanding accountability and responsibility; characteristics of and prevention of hostile work environments; quid pro quo harassment; reprisal prevention; and the relationship between leadership and a professional organizational climate. Training should be provided to military members, civilian employees, and local national employees at overseas locations when practicable.

A3.2.4.4. **(CSH04)** Evaluate whether instructors are provided with skills and competencies necessary to deliver credible training.

A3.2.5. **Homosexual Conduct Policy** *(Undersecretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness Memorandum on Implementation of Recommendations Concerning Homosexual Policy*, 12 Aug 99; *CSAF Memorandum on Homosexual Policy Guidance*, 10 Mar 00).

A3.2.5.1. Evaluate the training of all those charged with implementing the homosexual conduct policy.

A3.2.5.2. Assess commander, staff judge advocate, and investigator training on the DOD homosexual conduct policy.

A3.3. Mission Areas.

A3.3.1. Transportation.

A3.3.1.1. **(CTRA1)** Evaluate wing personnel deployment training (aircraft load planning, cargo processing/handling/loading, pax processing, and other applicable deployment training).

A3.3.1.2. **(CTRA2)** Assess the maintenance and management of vehicle assets.

A3.3.1.3. **(CTRA3)** Evaluate HAZMAT management procedures, processes, and safeguards (Vehicle Maintenance, Aerial Port, Shipment/Receipt).

A3.3.1.4. **(CTRA4)** Assess personal property and passenger movements for compliance with entitlements.

A3.3.2. **Supply.**

A3.3.2.1. **(CSUP1)** Evaluate Stock Control Management processes (to include the Regional Supply Squadron, if applicable) used to support weapon system spares and the base missions.

A3.3.2.2. **(CSUP2)** Assess Repair Cycle Management to ensure tracking, status accuracy, and turn-in methods for all unserviceable assets in maintenance, including the execution of Air Force weapon system warranty processing.

A3.3.2.3. **(CSUP3)** Evaluate management of mission capable (MICAP) requisitions and reporting system processes (to include the Regional Supply Squadron if applicable).

A3.3.2.4. **(CSUP4)** Assess physical control, accountability, serviceability, and efficient management of the Readiness Spares Packages (MRSP/IRSP) and Mission Support Kits (e.g., MSK/HPMSK).

A3.3.2.5. **(CSUP5)** Assess the Mobility Element's control, accountability, serviceability, and efficient management of mobility assets to include assets decentralized throughout the wing (i.e., mobility bags and weapons).

A3.3.2.6. **(CSUP6)** Assess facility and equipment inspection and preventative maintenance programs.

A3.3.2.7. **(CSUP7)** Assess confined space, hazardous communication training/awareness, environmental compliance practices pertaining to fuel servicing operations, receipts, transfers, and inventory management.

A3.3.2.8. **(CSUP8)** Evaluate Fuels Management Team’s ability to train, maintain, receive, store, issue, and account for quality bulk petroleum products, cryogenic fluids, and missile propellants in a safe and timely manner.

A3.3.2.9. **(ADDED) (CSUP9)** Assess management of the General Support Division of the Supply Stock Fund IAW AFMAN 23-110, Vol 1, Pt 3, Chap 6; Vol 2, Pt 2, Chap 2, and Vol 2, Pt 10, Chap 1.

A3.3.2.10. **(ADDED) (CSU10)** Assess equipment accountability to comply with supply discipline responsibilities across all functional areas.

A3.3.3. **Contracting.**

A3.3.3.1. **(CCON1)** Evaluate if acquisition planning, contract award, and contract administration procedures are conducted according to applicable laws, executive orders, Federal Acquisition Regulations, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement, Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, directives, instructions, and applicable Army FAR Supplement.

A3.3.3.2. **(CCON2)** Assess whether units plan for continuation of contractor services during crises as required by DODI 3020.37, AFI 63-124, AFPD 10-4, paragraph 3.5, and AFM 64-108.

A3.3.3.3. **(ADDED) (CCON3)** Evaluate management of the Government Purchase Card (GPC) Program across all functional areas IAW AFI 64-117.

A3.3.3.4. **(ADDED) (CCON4)** Evaluate Quality Assurance Evaluator (QAE) responsibilities across all functional areas IAW AFI 63-124 and AFPD 63-5.

A3.3.4. **Munitions (Non-Nuclear).**

A3.3.4.1. **(CMUN1)** Assess available Munitions Maintenance Handling Equipment and tools to meet mission requirements.

A3.3.4.2. **(CMUN2)** Assess munitions inspection procedures.

A3.3.4.3. **(CMUN3)** Assess the operations, control, and security of munitions, to include ordering, storage, and issuing procedures.

A3.3.5. **Civil Engineer.**

A3.3.5.1. **(CCE01)** Assess whether Civil Engineers are meeting present and future facility and infrastructure requirements in accordance with the Civil Engineer Strategic Plan in the following areas:

A3.3.5.1.1. Real Property Maintenance Activities: Real Property Maintenance (Restoration and Modernization, Facilities Sustainment Model), Real Property Services, and Demolition/ Consolidation.

A3.3.5.1.2. Work Information Management System (WIMS)/Automated Civil Engineering System (ACES).

A3.3.5.1.3. Real Property Accountability.

A3.3.5.1.4. Housing.

A3.3.5.2. **(CCE02)** Assess Prime BEEF/REDHORSE training and Air Force Specialty Certifications.

A3.3.5.3. **(CCE03)** Assess compliance with Qualitative NBC Fit Training, Mobility, and other readiness programs.

A3.3.5.4. **(ADDED) (CCE04)** Evaluate environmental compliance across all functional areas IAW AFI 32-7086.

A3.3.6. **Communications and Information.**

A3.3.6.1. **(CCI01)** Evaluate training to support mission-critical communication systems.

A3.3.6.2. **(CCI02)** Assess the planning, configuration control, physical infrastructure/medium, management, and maintenance of the base's communication infrastructure.

A3.3.6.3. **(CCI03)** Evaluate an installation's Spectrum Management program.

A3.3.6.4. **(CCI04)** Evaluate command and control systems maintenance.

A3.3.6.5. **(ADDED) (CCI05)** Evaluate the effective employment of information life-cycle management processes and workgroup management practices.

A3.3.6.6. **(ADDED) (CCI06)** Evaluate the effective management of Base Visual Information and Combat Camera Services and forces.

A3.3.7. **Disaster Response (Civil Engineer, Security Forces, Communications, Public Affairs, Services, etc.).**

A3.3.7.1. **(CDR01)** Evaluate whether the base exercise program complies with AFI 32-4001.

A3.3.8. **Plans and Programs.**

A3.3.8.1. **(CPP01)** Assess WRM management.

A3.3.8.2. **(CPP02)** Assess the Base Support Plan process adequacy for meeting OPLAN tasking (Part II).

A3.3.8.3. **(CPP03)** Assess the base's deployment planning process for all host and associate unit OPLAN taskings to include Unit Type Code (UTC) management.

A3.3.9. **Safety.**

A3.3.9.1. Assess how the organization adheres to safety guidelines and procedures to include applicable OSHA and explosives safety standards.

A3.3.10. **Occupational Health.**

A3.3.10.1. Assess how the organization adheres to occupational health guidelines and procedures to include applicable OSHA standards not covered by the Health Services Inspection.

A3.3.11. **Installation Security.**

A3.3.11.1. **(CIS01)** Assess force protection at home station. Force protection is comprised of law enforcement activities; antiterrorism; Information, Industrial, and Personnel Security; and security of Protection Level (PL) 1 (non-nuclear) through PL 4 resources.

A3.3.11.1.1. **(ADDED)** Assess Installation Security. Actions taken by all base agencies to keep personnel, equipment, and resources permanently and temporarily assigned, safe and secure.

A3.3.11.2. **(CIS02)** Assess Combat Arms Training and Maintenance support to wing personnel.

A3.3.11.3. **(CIS03)** Assess the confinement program.

A3.3.12. Services.

A3.3.12.1. **(ADDED) (CSV01)** Assess Prime RIBS home-station training.

A3.3.12.2. **(CSV02)** Assess unit mortuary affairs planning and support (to include plans, memorandum of understanding, support agreements, and case files).

A3.3.12.3. **(CSV03)** Assess appropriated fund food service operations (to include cash control, contract management, subsistence accountability, and adherence to sanitation standards).

A3.3.12.4. **(CSV04)** Assess lodging operations (to include cash control; financial management; adherence to Air Force furnishing, amenities, and service standards; and quarters utilization).

A3.3.12.5. **(CSV05)** Assess fitness facility operations (to include cash control, adherence to equipment and operation standards, and evaluation of programs)

A3.3.12.6. **(ADDED) (CSV06)** Assess internal control procedures in all services activities.

A3.3.12.7. **(CSV07)** Assess Dram Shop training in services activities.

A3.3.13. **Financial Management.**

A3.3.13.1. **(CFM01)** Evaluate leadership, quality assurance, Non-Appropriated Funds oversight, systems access controls, FMFIA, and audit liaison responsibilities in accordance with applicable laws, directives, and instructions (self-inspection checklist is available to assist MAJCOM/IGs and units as applicable).

A3.3.13.2. **(CFM02)** Evaluate pay, travel, accounting, and disbursing functions in accordance with applicable laws, directives, and instructions (self-inspection checklist is available to assist MAJCOM/IGs and units as applicable).

A3.3.13.3. **(CFM03)** Evaluate planning, programming, budgeting, and analysis functions in accordance with applicable laws, directives and instructions (self-inspection checklist is available to assist MAJCOM/IGs and units as applicable).

A3.3.13.4. **(CFM04)** Evaluate organization capability and training to conduct Independent Review Official and Economic Analysis duties in accordance with published guidance (AFPD 65-5, AFI 65-501, AFI 65-504, AFMAN 65-506, AFI 65-502, and AFI 65-503).

A3.3.14. **Personnel.**

A3.3.14.1. **(DP01)** Assess MPF to include: Personnel Relocation and Employment (includes personnel relocations, personnel employment and base training), Personnel Systems, Personnel Readiness, and Customer Support (includes customer service and career enhancement).

A3.3.14.2. **(CDP02)** Assess the commanders' support staff.

A3.3.15. Aircrew Protection (AFI 11-301, AFI 16-1301).

A3.3.15.1. **(CAP01)** Evaluate the wing/unit's Aircrew Life Support (ALS) training program. Assess the unit's accomplishment of performance-based evaluations to ensure each aircrew member's capability to fully utilize their ALS and survival equipment in realistic scenarios they are likely to encounter.

A3.3.15.2. **(CAP02)** Assess ALS equipment availability, serviceability, configuration, unit funding, accountability, and management. Assess whether ALS unit and supporting agency equipment inspection and preventative maintenance practices are compliant with applicable technical orders and higher headquarters instructions/directives in accordance with published guidance (AFI 11-301).

A3.3.15.3. **(CAP03)** Evaluate the unit's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) program for compliance with applicable directives (AFI 16-1301).

A3.3.16. **Self-Inspection Program.**

A3.3.16.1. **(ADDED) (CSIP1)** Assess Unit Self-Inspection Program.

Attachment 4

EORI MUNITIONS REQUIREMENTS

A4.1. Each AMC active duty and AMC-gained ANG and AFRC unit participating in an AMC IGX will be issued munitions listed in **Table A4.1.** upon arrival at the CRTC.

Table A4.1. Munitions Requirements.

Nomenclature	FSC	DODIC	Quantity
Cartridge, 5.56MM blank	1305	A080	60 rounds per person (for SF) 20 rounds per person (all others)
Cartridge, 5.56MM blank (linked)	1305	A075	400 rounds per M-249
Cartridge, 7.62MM blank	1305	A111	500 rounds per weapon
Simulator, Artillery, M115A2	1370	L594	30 each (for IG use)
Grenade, smoke, colored, M18	*	*	32 each (for IG use)
* Use any mix of the following colors: green-1330, G940; yellow-1330, G945			

A4.2. The lead unit for each IGX will ensure the deploying unit munitions supply point representative is assigned to the ADVON team. This individual will coordinate with the CRTC and account for all IGX training munitions. Munitions for all deploying personnel will be issued to this individual after he/she establishes a munitions supply account with the CRTC munitions supply officer.

A4.3. The munitions requirement for EOD participation identified in **Table A4.2.** will be issued at the CRTC.

Table A4.2. EOD Munitions Requirements.

Nomenclature	FSC	DODIC	Quantity
Cartridge, cal .50 ball	1305	A584	5 each
Cartridge, cal .50 blank, electric	1385	M174	5 each
Fuse blasting time, M700	1375	M670	50 feet
Igniter, fuse, M60	1375	M766	10 each
Cord, detonating	1375	M456	100 feet
Cap, blasting, non-electric	1375	M131	10 each
Cap, blasting, elect	1375	M130	10 each